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1. INTRODUCTION
For Indian tribes throughout most of U.S. history, "the people of the
states where they are found are often their deadliest enemies."I Recently,
however, tribes and states have been able to find sufficient common ground
in order to work cooperatively in certain areas, particularly as state budget
2deficits continue to worsen. In some instances, Congress has mandated such
cooperation. 3 In other instances, the cooperative activity has arisen between
the parties themselves as a practical matter.4 In either situation, tribes and
states often find themselves at the bargaining table.
The negotiation dynamics of tribal-state compacting, however, may be
challenging. The parties have experienced centuries of animosity. The
"shadow of the law" relevant to the substance of the negotiation is ill-defined
or easily misunderstood, as is often the case with Indian law. Questions
about the boundaries of Indian Country5 may be unsettled and subject to liti-
gation. Finally, significant cultural differences obscure common ground that
may facilitate a successful negotiation.
While the range of tribal-state compacts is large,6 Indian gaming has
7generated the greatest amount of attention in recent years. Although Indian
1. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886).
2. See, e.g., infra Part VI.A.
3. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 defines "Indian [C]ountry" as
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdic-
tion of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation,
(b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United
States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
(c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extin-
guished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006).
6. In addition to gaming compacts, tribes and states have negotiated compacts
covering such areas as law enforcement, child protection, environmental manage-
ment, hunting and fishing, and taxation. See infra Part II.C.
7. See NAT'L INDIAN GAMING ASS'N, AN ANALYSIS OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT
OF INDIAN GAMING IN 2005, at 22 (2005), available at http://www.indiangaming.org/
NIGAecon impact 2005.pdf [hereinafter INDIAN GAMING IN 2005]; see also NAT'L
GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, NATIONAL GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY
1046 [Vol. 76
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tribes have conducted gaming operations since the 1970s, the advent of large-
scale tribal casinos dramatically increased the economic impact of Indian
gaming. Most of the tribes that launched successful casinos had a common
rags-to-riches story, but the story of the Mashantucket Pequots is unique.
Having been nearly annihilated more than 350 years earlier,9 the Pequots
opened their Foxwoods casino in 199210 and negotiated a compact with the
State of Connecticut that allowed the tribe to install slot machines in return
for a share of the slot proceeds." With the increased revenue from slots,
Foxwoods now generates more than $1 billion annually, with the state receiv-
ing significant revenues from the tribe.12
Over the last two decades, the immense success of the Pequot gaming
operation and the substantial revenue shared with the State of Connecticut
have become almost mythical in nature, with other states often misunder-
standing the lessons of the Foxwoods story. When state budgets faced un-
precedented fiscal woes, many state officials erroneously assumed that the
revenue sharing provisions of the Pequot compact were a tax that the state
was entitled to impose; officials then sought to obtain "Connecticut deals" for
their respective states.' Other states mistakenly saw Foxwoods as a natural
consequence of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).14 The true story
behind the Pequot gaming compact, however, is one of strategic negotiation
and the leveraging of tribal sovereignty into economic opportunity. Not in-
cluded in the "myth" is the fact that the tribe only agreed to share revenues
with the state in return for a valuable de facto monopoly: the exclusive right
COMMISSION REPORT 2-10 (1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
ngisc/reports/2.pdf.
8. See INDIAN GAMING IN 2005, supra note 7, at 27-28.
9. See KIM ISAAc EISLER, REVENGE OF THE PEQUOTS 30-36 (2001).
10. Id. at 17.
11. See infra Part VI.
12. See, e.g., Foxwoods Reports October 2011 Slot Revenue, CASINOMAN.NET,
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/foxwoods-reports-october-20 11-slot-revenue-
2011-11-15 (Connecticut has received more than $3 billion from the tribe.).
13. See, e.g., Michael DeArmond & Michael Fisher, Gaming Fight Far from
Over; Casinos: Ballot Losses Spur Tribes, Card Clubs and Horse Tracks to Consider
Other Options, PRESS- ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Nov. 5, 2004, at Al (discussing
Gov. Schwarzenegger's efforts to obtain gaming revenue from tribes after claiming
the "Indians are ripping us off' during his electoral campaign); Editorial, Big Chief
Pataki, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2002, at A14 (discussing legislation allowing Gov.
Pataki to negotiate gaming compacts with New York tribes); Susannah Rosenblatt,
Tribes with Casino Profits Averse to Aiding Strapped States, L.A. TIMES, July 10,
2003, http://articles.Iatimes.com/2003/jul/10/nation/na-gamblel0 (discussing tribal
negotiations with Gov. Gray Davis in California and profit sharing by the Pojoaque in
New Mexico); see also Lolita C. Baldor, Tribes Complain States Getting Greedy over
Gambling Revenue, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 10, 2003, http://www.1asvegassun.com/
news/2003/jul/10/tribes-complain-states-getting-greedy-over-gamblin/.
14. See infra Part Ill.E for a discussion of IGRA.
2011] 1047
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to operate slot machines in Connecticut, which in turn satisfied the state's
desire to limit the expansion of gaming.1
The other danger of over-elevating the "myth" of the Foxwoods negotia-
tions is to overlook the need for compacts outside the gaming context. Thus,
in order to appreciate the lessons of Foxwoods, those negotiations must be
placed in the context of Indian law. The very existence of the Indian gaming
phenomenon arose out of a core tenet of Indian law: Indian tribes are sover-
eign governmental entities.' 6 In the case of Foxwoods, the revenue sharing
provision was not a tax but was instead a voluntary, negotiated transfer be-
-17tween sovereigns.
Part II of this Article discusses the sovereign nature of tribal govern-
ments and reviews the history of tribal sovereignty, concluding with an exam-
ination of tribal-state compacting outside of the gaming context. Part III ex-
amines the origins of Indian gaming, focusing on the development of the le-
gal framework which governs tribal gaming activities and necessitates the
negotiation of tribal-state gaming compacts. Given the need for tribal-state
negotiations, Part IV presents a framework for structuring and analyzing ne-
gotiations. Part V applies that framework in the retelling of the first part of
the Foxwoods story, the negotiations regarding the original gaming compact.
The story of Foxwoods, however, has a second chapter involving the subse-
quent negotiations over installing slot machines at the casino, and Part VI
uses the same analytic framework.
Part VII evaluates the change in the negotiation landscape in response to
the Foxwoods negotiations and assesses the impact of technological changes
on Indian gaming. Part VIII concludes by arguing that, although the relative
tribal-state positions may have changed, much of the fundamental negotiation
dynamic remains the same, and thus many of the lessons of Foxwoods are
applicable today.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIAN LAW AND POLICY
While each tribe has its own separate history, the struggle to maintain a
separate, sovereign existence is common to most tribes, and while Pequot
history has many unique elements, their struggle and ultimate triumph simi-
larly demonstrate that the "first key to economic development is sovereign-
ty. "'8 Although the status of tribes as separate sovereigns has not always
been clear, the concept has still played a vital part in tribal and U. S. history.
15. See infra Part VI.B.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part V.
18. Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian Country To-
day, 5 COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT (FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY) 5, 5 (1997).
1048 [ Vol. 76
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A. Early Pequot History
The Pequots were once one of the most powerful Indian nations in New
England, but the English almost annihilated them during the Pequot War of
1637.19 Thirty years later, as a compensatory measure, the Pequots obtained
a reservation of approximately 2000 acres at Mashantucket, 20 which would
eventually become Ledyard, Connecticut.
Colonial settlers, however, gradually encroached upon the Pequots'
land. In 1761, after settlers had appropriated half the Pequots' territory, a
21judge deeded that half to the settlers. In 1855, a county court expropriated
and sold 800 of the remaining 1000 acres of Pequot land to neighboring prop-
erty owners.22
The population on the 200-acre Pequot reservation dwindled. By the
1950s, Elizabeth George, grandmother of eventual tribal chairman Richard
Hayward, was the only Pequot living on the reservation, and her resolve
earned her the nickname "Iron Lady." 23 She led a successful campaign
against a Connecticut plan to turn the reservation into a state park.24 In time,
George's half-sister joined her, and until the mid-1970s, the two remained the
25
only residents on the reservation. In 1975 Richard Hayward was elected
26tribal chairman. He left his job as a pipe fitter at the nearby Electric Boat
shipyard, moved onto tribal land, and set about rebuilding the reservation's
Pequot population.27 Hayward managed to entice some tribe members back
by offering used mobile homes to those who settled on Pequot land, using
homes the tribe had acquired from the federal government for $1000 to $1500
each.28 By 1979, with twenty-three year-round residents on the reservation
19. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 31-36.
20. Id. at 42 (characterizing the land as the "worst, most snake-infested, rock-
ledged, swamp-filled, uninhabitable land in the whole [area]"). The name
Mushantuxet, as the area was referred to at the time, means "much-wooded land." Id.
21. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation Timeline, MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT
MUSEUM & RES. CENTER, http://www.pequotmuseum.org/TribalHistory/TribalHistory
Overview/TimelineofEvents.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Timeline].
22. Tracie Rozhon, Connecticut Tribes Seek Land and Identity, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 1981,§ l1, at 1.
23. BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, NATIVE AMERICANS TODAY: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 125 (2010).
24. See Hold on to the Land, MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT MUSEUM & RES. CENTER,
http://www.pequotmuseum.org/ExhibitGalleries/LifeontheReservationll/Holdontothe
Land.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
25. EISLER, supra note 9, at 53.
26. Timeline, supra note 21.
27. See DONALD LEE FIXICO, AMERICAN INDIANS IN A MODERN WORLD 193
(2006).
28. William G. Flanagan & James Samuelson, The New Buffalo - but Who Got
the Meat?, FORBES, Sept. 8, 1997, at 148, available at http://www.forbes.com/
forbes/1997/0908/6005148a.html [hereinafter New Buffalo]; Hilary Waldman, With
201l] 1049
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and many other people visiting and helping with development efforts, the
tribe received a $1 million loan from the Department of Housing and Urban
Development to build new homes.29
As tribe members returned, the Pequots sought to reclaim lost land. In
1976 the tribe sued the State of Connecticut, claiming that the sale of 2000
acres of Pequot land by the State of Connecticut violated Federal law. 3 0 In
particular, the Pequots argued that Connecticut failed to follow a 1790 law
requiring the federal government to approve all sales of Indian land, and that
the 1855 sale of Pequot land violated that law.
Seven years later, urged by the Connecticut Congressional delegation to
settle the suit, President Ronald Reagan signed the 1983 Connecticut Settle-
ment Act.32 The Act provided the Pequots with $900,000 in federal funds for
a combination of land purchases and economic development projects.33 In
1984, using funds from the settlement, the Pequots purchased 650 acres of
34land that previously had been part of the reservation. They also bought a
pizza restaurant and started a gravel business and a maple sugar production
enterprise.
Land expansion and the tribe's handful of new businesses attracted scat-
tered Pequots back to the reservation. Those who could demonstrate ancestry
of at least one-sixteenth Mashantucket Pequot were admitted to the tribe and
could establish residency on tribal lands.3 6 By 1985, roughly thirty Pequots
lived on the reservation. 37 With mixed marriages and families of intermarried
couples, the reservation's total population was approximately seventy-five.38
Wealth Comes Return to Heritage, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 22, 1991, at Al, avail-
able at http://articles.courant.com/1991-12-22/news/0000207975_1_mashantucket-
pequots-tribe-drum [hereinafter Waldman, Return to Heritage].
29. See Waldman, Return to Heritage, supra note 28.
30. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 81-82.
31. Peggy McCarthy, Pequot Indians Planning Bingo on Reservation, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 1985, § 23, at 1.
32. Tribal History, MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION,
http://www.mashantucket.com/tribalhistory.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
33. See 25 U.S.C. § 1754 (2006).
34. See 650 Acres Regained by Indians, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1984, § 1, at 55.
35. DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, ROLL THE BONES: THE HISTORY OF GAMBLING 437
(2006).
36. See Nick Ravo, Business Sense and Bingo: An Indian Tribe Prospers, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1987, § B, at 1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1987/
12/03/nyregion/talk-pequot-reservation-business-sense-bingo-indian-tibe-
prospers.html?pagewanted=all&src-pm.
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B. Tribes as Separate Sovereigns"
Although the immense success of Foxwoods was years away, the tribe's
land claim and its recognition as a tribe laid the foundation upon which Fox-
woods would be built. The question then arises, how could a tribe like the
Pequots engineer such a return from the brink of extinction? The partial an-
swer lies in the concept of tribes as separate sovereigns whose existence ex-
tends beyond the lifetimes of the individual members of a tribe at any given
point in time. A tribe continues to exist as a sovereign entity so long as one
member remains. The forces that could cause a tribe to dwindle down to one
member, however, have been present since the formation of this nation.
As the newly formed United States began its inexorable march west-
ward, it developed an insatiable appetite for more land. Unfortunately, 40 the
Indians occupied the desired land. To satisfy western expansion goals, the
Indian lands usually were not taken by force but were instead ceded 41 to the
United States by treaty in return for, among other things, the establishment of
a trust relationship.42 The federal government thus assumed a guardian-ward
39. Portions of this Part draw heavily from two articles previously published by
the lead author in the Michigan Journal of Race and Law and the North Carolina Law
Review. See Gavin Clarkson, Not Because They Are Brown, but Because ofEa*: Why
the Good Guys Lost in Rice v. Cayetano, and Why They Didn't Have to Lose, 7 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 317 (2002) [hereinafter Clarkson, Not Because They Are Brown]; Gavin
Clarkson, Tribal Bonds: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory Restraints on Tribal Eco-
nomic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1009 (2007) [hereinafter Clarkson, Tribal
Bonds].
40. That is, unfortunately for the Indians.
41. Tribes in the East were more likely to be removed to Oklahoma, whereas
tribes in the West tended to have their land holdings reduced to smaller reservations.
Compare Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, U.S. - Choctaw Nation, Sept. 27, 1830,
reprinted in I INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 310-11 (Charles J. Kappler ed.,
1904) (signed by Choctaw leaders at bok chukfi ahithac - "the little creek where the
rabbits dance" - providing for the removal from their ancestral homelands in Missis-
sippi and Alabama to land in southeastern Oklahoma), with Fort Laramie Treaty, U.S.
- Sioux Nation, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY 109 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Fort
Laramie Treaty] (signed by the Sioux Nation at the conclusion of the Powder River
War, establishing a reservation).
42. The scope of the trust relationship is multi-faceted. "Many treaties explicitly
provided for protection by the United States." I FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 1.03[l] (2005). See, e.g., Treaty with the
Kaskaskia, U.S. - Kaskaskia Nation, art. II, Aug. 13, 1803, 7 Stat. 78, reprinted in I
INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 41, at 67 [hereinafter Treaty with
the Kaskaskia]; Treaty with the Creeks, U.S. - Creek Nation, art. II, Aug. 7, 1790, 7
Stat. 35, reprinted in I INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 41, at 25
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relationship with the Indians. This relationship was assumed not only be-
cause of prevailing racist notions of Indian societal inferiority, 43 but also be-
cause the trust relationship often was consideration for the Indians' relin-
quishment of lard." Notably, the Indians and the federal government entered
into these treaties as government-to-government relationships among collec-
tive political entities.45 From the beginning of its political existence, the
United States "recognized a measure of autonomy in the Indian bands and
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States, - dependent largely for their daily food;
dependent for their political rights. . . . From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Gov-
ernment with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there
arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the [E]xecutive, and by [C]ongress, and by this court,
whenever the question has arisen.
Id. at 383-84.
Other treaties provided the means for subsistence. See, e.g., Fort Laramie Treaty,
supra note 41, at 112 (providing for subsistence rations for the Sioux); Treaty with the
Western Cherokees, U.S. - Cherokee Nation, Art. 8, May 6, 1828, 7 Stat. 313, re-
printed in I INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra note 41, at 290 [hereinafter
Treaty with the Western Cherokee] ("[E]ach Head of a Cherokee family ... who may
desire to remove West, shall be given, on enrolling himself for emigration, a good
Rifle, a Blanket, and a Kettle, and five pounds of Tobacco: (and to each member of
his family one Blanket,) also a just compensation for the property he may abandon ...
."); I COHEN, supra, § 1.03[3].
43. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 588 (1832) ("The humane poli-
cy of the government towards these children of the wilderness must afford pleasure to
every benevolent feeling . . . ."); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831)
("[Indians] are in a state of pupilage. Their relations to the United States resemble
that of a ward to his guardian."); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823) ("But
the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose occupation
was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in
possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness . . . ."). These three
cases, often referred to as the "Marshall Trilogy," form much of the foundation for
federal Indian law, Matthew L. M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy,
82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 627-28 (2006), particularly the notion of the guardian-ward
relationship and the concept of Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations." Cher-
okee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2.
44. See, e.g., Fort Laramie Treaty, supra note 41, at 110; Treaty with the West-
ern Cherokees, supra note 42, at 288; Treaty with the Kaskaskia, supra note 42, at 67;
Treaty with the Creeks, supra note 42, at 26-27.
45. See, e.g., Fort Laramie Treaty, U.S. - Sioux Nation, Sept. 17, 1851, reprinted
in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 41, at 84 (referring to
the United States and the Sioux collectively as "the aforesaid nations"); Treaty of Fort
McIntosh, Jan. 21, 1785, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY,
supra note 41, at 5; Treaty with the Six Nations, U.S.-Six Nations, Oct. 22, 1784,
reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 41, at 4.
1052 [Vol. 76
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tribes. Treaties rested upon a concept of Indian sovereignty ... and in turn
greatly contributed to that concept.'"'6
While the formal existence of the United States began at a point in time
when the prevailing policy of treaty-making recognized tribal sovereignty,
such an orientation was not permanent. In the 1870s, Congress ceased mak-
ing treaties with the IndianS47 and instead developed a policy48 that was char-
acterized as a "mighty pulverizing engine,"49 a policy that would destroy
tribalism and force Indians to assimilate into dominant society as individu-
als.5 o The policy devastated the tribes, and its consequences remain highly
problematic.5 1
The United States changed its policies toward tribal government struc-
tures again in 1928. In response to a report documenting the failure of federal
Indian policy, 52 Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
46. FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 2 (1994).
47. Treaty making with the Indians was ended by Congress in 1871: "[H]ereafter
no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowl-
edged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United
States may contract by treaty .... " Abolition of Treaty Making, 16 Stat. 544, 566
(1871) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra note 41, at 135.
48. See General Allotment Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 339, 341-42, 348-49, 354, 381 (2006)). The statute is also known
as the Dawes Act after Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts. See Harjo v.
Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1121 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'dsub nom. Harjo v. Andrus, 581
F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978). While the Dawes Act represented the final, full-scale
realization of the allotment policy, many treaties made with western tribes from 1865
to 1868 provided for allotment in severalty of tribal lands. See ROBERT WINSTON
MARDOCK, THE REFORMERS AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 212 (1971).
49. 35 CONG. REC. 81, 90 (1901). In an address to Congress in 1901, President
Theodore Roosevelt expressed his sense of the assimilation policy:
[T]he time has arrived when we should definitely make up our minds to
recognize the Indian as an individual and not as a member of a tribe. The
General Allotment Act is a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the trib-
al mass [acting] directly upon the family and the individual.
Id. (emphasis added).
50. DAVID GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW,
141-42 (4th ed. 1998).
51. See Cobell v. Norton, 392 F.3d 461, 463-65 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Class
Action Settlement Agreement at 2-6, Cobell v. Salazar, No. 1:96CV01285-JR (D.D.C.
Dec. 10, 2010), available at http://www.indiantrust.com/docs/saI_191ll.pdf (class
action settlement agreement for the Cobell case).
52. See generally INST. FOR GOv'T RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION (Lewis Meriam et al. eds., 1928). The primary thrust of this report
was to document the failure of federal Indian policy during the allotment period. I
COHEN, supra note 42, § 1.05.
2011] I1053
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(IRA). In an effort to reinforce tribal sovereignty, the legislation allowed
tribes to adopt constitutions and to reestablish structures for governance.54
Congress also passed specific acts55 to reverse the effects of previous policies
established with the intention of destroying the governance structure of par-
ticular tribes, such as the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma. 56 Congressional
policy had once again reversed itself - instead of destroying tribal sovereign-
ty, the federal government was now encouraging it.57 As a result, many tribes
began to thrive economically.58 The IRA "provided a powerful stimulus to
tribal governmental organization and in many cases so strengthened that or-
ganization as to enable continued development despite fluctuations in admin-
istrative policy." 59
53. See Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act) of 1934, Pub. L. No.
73-383, 48 Stat. 984, (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-94 (2006)).
54. Clarkson, Tribal Bonds, supra note 39, at 1027.
55. The Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act of 1936 (OIWA), Pub. L. No. 74-816, 49
Stat. 1967 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 503 (2006)), "permitted Oklahoma
Indians to take advantage of most of the provisions of the 1934 Wheeler-Howard Act,
which ended allotments in severalty, allowed the re-establishment of communal lands,
and permitted the organization of tribal governments with control over tribal funds."
Morris v. Watt, 640 F.2d 404, 409 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
56. The Curtis Act, Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495, and the Five
Tribes Act, Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137, were both designed to de-
stroy tribal cohesiveness among the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee, and Sem-
inole Nations. See Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1133 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. Harjo v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Kirke Kickingbird, "Way
Down Yonder in the Indian Nations, Rode My Pony Cross the Reservation!" from
"Oklahoma Hills" by Woody Guthrie, 29 TULSA L.J. 303, 306, 319, 322 (1993). The
Five Tribes Act was particularly brutal in its dismantling of any sense of political
autonomy:
That the tribal existence and present tribal governments of the Choctaw,
Chickasaw, Cherokee, Creek and Seminole tribes or nations are hereby
continued in full force and effect for all purposes authorized by law, until
otherwise provided by law, but the tribal council or legislature in any of
said tribes or nations shall not be in session for a longer period than thirty
days in any one year: Provided, That no act, ordinance, or resolution (ex-
cept resolutions for adjournment) of the tribal council or legislature of any
of said tribes or nations shall be of any validity until approved by the Pres-
ident of the United States: Provided further, That no contract involving the
payment or expenditure of any money or affecting any property belonging
to any of said tribes or nations made by them or any of them or by any of-
ficer thereof, shall be of any validity until approved by the President of the
United States.
Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 1129.
57. Clarkson, Tribal Bonds, supra note 39, at 1027.
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Federal Indian policies would oscillate through one more cycle in the
next half-century.6o A 1949 Report on Indian Affairs by the Hoover Com-
mission recommended "'complete integration' of Indians [as a federal policy]
goal so that Indians would move 'into the mass of the population as full ...
citizens."' 61 As a result, in 1953 the official congressional policy changed to
one of ending the Indians "status as wards of the United States."62 For the
tribes that were "terminated" under this policy, the results were disastrous. 63
Just as Congress had reversed itself when it repudiated allotment and
passed the IRA, the policy of termination also was short-lived. Ironically,
termination had the opposite effect in its attempt to detribalize. Indians
finally recognized that federal policy too often was directed at destroying
tribalism.66 From that perspective, they concluded "that only tribal control of
Indian policy and lasting guarantees of sovereignty could assure tribal surviv-
al in the United States."6 With the Kennedy and Johnson administrations'
abandonment of the termination policy, "programs such as the Economic
Opportunity Act [were passed, which] recognized the permanency of Indian
tribes and the importance of social investment in reservation communities."68
President Richard Nixon was arguably the most ardent supporter of In-
dian sovereignty, and he issued a landmark statement calling for a new feder-
69
al policy of "self-determination" for Indian nations. Perhaps the greatest of
Nixon's contributions to Indian tribal sovereignty was Public Law 638, the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, which au-
thorized the Secretaries of Interior and Health and Human Services to con-
tract with and make grants to Indian tribes and other Indian organizations for
the delivery of federal services.70 Acting at times pursuant to federal court
60. Clarkson, Tribal Bonds, supra note 39, at 1027.
61. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 50, at 204 (quoting Commission on the Organi-
zation of the Executive Branch of Government. Indian Affairs: A Report to Congress
(Mar. 1949)).
62. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong. (1953).
63. See I COHEN, supra note 42, § 1.06.
64. Clarkson, Not Because They Are Brown, supra note 39, at 331.
65. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 50, at 224.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 226.
69. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommenda-
tions for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 (1970). See also Indian Financing Act
of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 145 1-
1453 (2006)).
70. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (2006)).
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orders,7 1 the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)72 assisted tribes in reconstituting
their governmental structures.
During this period, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down Morton v.
Mancari, one of the most important Indian cases of the modem era. The
Court held that tribal Indians were "members of quasi-sovereign tribal enti-
ties" 74 and that Indian status was thus "political rather than racial in nature." 75
Mancari involved the BIA's hiring preference for Indians, but the Court ex-
tended its holding to other areas of Indian policy as "long as the special
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obliga-
tion toward the Indians," and the policy "is reasonable and rationally de-
signed to further Indian self-government."76
Thus, through acts of Congress and Supreme Court rulings, tribes are
ensconced within the federalism framework. In the words of Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, "Today, in the United States, we have three types of sover-
eign entities - [T]he Federal government, the states, and the Indian tribes.
Each of the[se] sovereigns . . . plays an important role . . . in this country." 77
C. SelfDetermination and Tribal-State Compacting
In addition to the reaffirmation of a government-to-government relation-
ship between tribes and the federal government, states began to realize that
tribes were not going away and that in the federalist system there were three
separate sovereigns. In part because of this recognition of a federalist trium-
virate, a delicate but vital spirit of cooperation between tribes and states has
grown across the nation. For example, the Western Governors' Association
has determined that, especially in rural areas, tribes and states face many of
71. See, e.g., Morris v. Watt, 640 F.2d 404, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Harjo v.
Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110, 1147 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Harjo v. Andrus, 581
F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In both instances, the court order reinstated tribal constitu-
tions from the 19th century. Morris, 640 F.2d at 414-16; Harjo, 420 F. Supp. at 144-
46. The BIA subsequently assisted the tribes in redrafting modern constitutions. See
Gavin Clarkson, Reclaiming Jurisprudential Sovereignty: A Tribal Judiciary Analy-
sis, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 473, 487-89 (2002).
72. The BIA is part of the Department of the Interior and is the primary agency
responsible for managing Indian affairs, although other agencies such as the Depart-
ment of Justice and Health and Human Services also have specialized departments for
interaction with Indian tribes. See Indian Affairs, U.S. DEPARTMENT INTERIOR,
http://www.bia.gov/WhoWeAre/index.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
73. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
74. Id. at 554.
75. Id. at 553 n.24.
76. Id. at 555; see, e.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977);
Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463, 480 (1976); Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976) (per curiam).
77. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal
Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997).
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the same problems, and the Association has begun projects among state
governors, tribal chairmen, and interested groups to promote these mutual
concerns.79 In addition, the Conference of State Chief Justices has recog-
nized the jurisdictional confusion that inevitably arises between a tribe and a
state. Accordingly, the Conference has begun implementing strategies to
promote communication, cooperation, and comity between state and tribal
courts.so Emphasizing the need for mutual respect between the two courts
and their common interest in serving all of the people within their jurisdic-
tions, the Conference reiterated that effective enforcement is needed to create
an orderly environment and that tribal and state authorities should be full
participants in justice. One of their specific recommendations is to "make
intergovernmental agreements that provide for cross-utilization of facilities,
programs, and personnel by state and tribal court systems." 82
Certain states have developed actual frameworks for entering into inter-
governmental agreements with tribes.83 For example, South Dakota has en-
acted a statute that states, "It is the policy of the state to consult with a tribal
government regarding the conduct of state government programs [that] have
the potential of affecting tribal members on the reservation." 84 South Dakota
also recognizes tribal court orders and judgments. In Wisconsin, an execu-
tive order provides that state agencies "recognize the unique govemment-to-
government relationship between the State of Wisconsin and Indian Tribes"
and "accord Tribal governments the same respect accorded other govern-
ments." 86
78. FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 160 n.98 (1995) (citing 1990
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, A NEW ERA FOR
STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS 14 (1990)).
79. Id. (citing 1990 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE WESTERN GOVERNORS'
ASSOCIATION, A NEW ERA FOR STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS 15-18).
80. See, e.g., Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution 5: To Encourage Greater
Collaboration Between State Courts and Tribal Courts to Protect Native American
Children, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ISSUES AND RESOURCES (Jan. 26, 2011), available at
http://indigenouspeoplesissues.com/attachments/article/8875/CCJ-COSCA-
Resolution201 I.pdf.
81. Stanley G. Feldman & David L. Withey, Resolving State- Tribal Jurisdiction-
al Dilemmas, 79 JUDICATURE 154, 156 (1995).
82. Id. at 156; see also Dennis Gibb, Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Na-
tive American Law: Models for Expanded Usage, 112 HARv. L. REV. 922, 927, 929-
30(1999).
83. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-12A-4.1 (Westlaw through 2011 Exec.
Order I1-I and Sup. Ct. R. I1-17).
84. Id. § 1-54-5.
85. Id. § 1-1-25.
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Even Nevada, which fought a contentious battle against tribal jurisdic-
tion in Nevada v. Hicks,8 has entered into a number of tribal-state coopera-
tive agreements and has experienced amicable relationships with tribes. The
Nevada Attorney General described the relationship as follows: "[the current
atmosphere] allows the state and the tribes to approach each other (warily
certainly, but not from the narrow vantage point of absolute mistrust of mo-
tive and ultimate intent) on a government-to-government basis."88 Also in
Nevada, the Attorney General has issued a number of opinions delineating
tribal-state cooperation, 89 and the legislature has passed a number of statutes
regarding tribal-state cooperation.90
Some of the tribal-state cooperation has been a result of congressional
mandate. For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 91 identifies the
Tribal Courts as the vehicle for the implementation of federal policy. ICWA
mandates that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over certain Indian child cus-
tody proceedings and requires their transfer from state to tribal court. 92Un-
der ICWA, states shall give full faith and credit to any Indian tribe proceeding
applicable to Indian child custody. 93 ICWA also authorizes states and tribes
"to enter into agreements with each other respecting care and custody of Indi-
87. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
88. Frank R. Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36
S.D. L. REV. 239, 268 n.202 (1991).
89. See, e.g., Indians; Jurisdiction; Criminal Law; Arrest, Nev. Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 19 (1994) ("Tribal authorities are authorized by [state statute] NRS 171.1255 to
arrest certain non-Indians who violate state law in Indian country. There is no re-
quirement for an agreement between the affected tribe and any other political entity
before such authority may be exercised."); Indians; Gaming; Liquor, Nev. Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 3 (1991) (suggesting that the county enter into a cooperative agreement with
the Fort Mojave Tribe to identify rights and obligations between the State and Tribal
Law enforcement); see also Nevada Highway Patrol Jurisdiction on Indian Reserva-
tions, Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 42 (1980) ("[T]he State ... would be interfering with
the right of Indians to govern themselves if the State were allowed to exercise juris-
diction over tribal Indians committing traffic violations on state highways within the
exterior bounds of the Indian reservation.") A Nevada Highway Patrol officer cannot
cite/arrest a tribal Indian in Indian country, he only has the power over non-Indians.
Id.
90. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.430 (West, Westlaw through 2009 75th Reg-
ular Session and 2010 26th Special Sess.) (Jurisdiction over Proceedings in which
Indians are Parties) (stating that Nevada assumes jurisdiction over offenses and civil
action by or against Indians in Indian country under PL 280 unless the tribe did not
consent to the state's jurisdiction); id. § 233A.020 (setting up an Indian Commission);
see also id. § 171.1255 (authorizing tribal police to make arrests outside reservation
boundaries when the tribal officer is in fresh pursuit of a person who committed a
crime on the reservation); id. § 233A.130 (stating that jurisdiction of administrative
agencies is not extended over Indian country without consent).
91. 25 U.S.C §§ 1901-63 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
92. Id. § 1911(a)-(b).
93. Id. § 1911(d).
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an children and jurisdiction over child custody proceedings."9 4 Congressional
requirements of state-tribal cooperation extend outside the arena of child wel-
fare as well.
In addition to mandated federal policy, tribes and states also have initi-
ated cooperative activity on their own. Formal and informal agreements be-
tween state or local governments and tribes cover a wide range of issues.
These legal instruments take many forms, including memoranda of under-
standing, memoranda of agreement, inter-governmental agreements, com-
pacts, and collaboration agreements. 96 Professor Frank Pommersheim's 1991
law review article97 detailed eighty-seven such agreements, including
agreements on jurisdiction,99 the environment, 00 hunting and fishing,' 0
health and welfare programs,' 02 and Indian burial sites. 0 3
94. Id. § 1919.
95. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)); Safe Homes for Woman Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40221(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 1927 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2006)) (providing full faith and credit accorded to all protection
orders from other jurisdictions, including tribal courts); Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)); Johnson O'Malley Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 167, 48 Stat. 596 (codified as reenacted and amended at 25 U.S.C.
§§ 452-57 (2006)); Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297,
102 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2501-11 (2006)) (stating that
tribes can operate schools formerly run by BIA); Indian Child Protection and Family
Violence Prevention Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-630, 104 Stat. 4544 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3201-11 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)) (authorizing the ex-
change of child abuse information between Indian Nations and state governments and
dictating that Tribal governments shall be treated the same as other federal govern-
ment entities).
96. See, e.g., Jerry Gardner, Improving the Relationship Between Indian Nations,
the Federal Government, and State Governments, TRIBAL CT. CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.tribal-institute.org/articles/mou.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2011).
97. See Pommersheim, supra note 88.
98. Id. at 266. Professor Pommersheim's tally was as follows:
Jurisdiction or PL 280 Agreements 5
Environmental Agreements 13
Hunting and Fishing 18
Health and Welfare Programs 17
Water Agreements II
Indian Burial Sites 4
Law Enforcement 7
Economic or Taxing Agreements 10
Education Agreements or Awareness Projects 2
Id.
99. Id. Pursuant to Public Law 280,
Congress mandated that certain states accept jurisdiction on reservations,
while permitting other states to assume jurisdiction on reservations, if cer-
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States have numerous and powerful interests in creating agreements
with tribes,10 as evidenced by the fact that the states have negotiated hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of such agreements since the 1980s. An empirical
examination of this activity indicates that, as he suspected, Professor Pom-
mersheim barely scratched the surface in terms of assessing the level of trib-
al-state compacting activity.
1. Education
The National Congress of American Indians estimates that as many as
450,000 Indian children are in elementary and secondary schools in the Unit-
ed States.105 Only 10% of these children attend BIA schools on reservations,
tain conditions were met (Both Nebraska and Wisconsin have entered into
limited Public Law 280 jurisdiction with two tribes.). For example, the
Omaha and Winnebago tribes have retroceded their jurisdiction and, in
conjunction with this retrocession, have entered into cross-deputization
agreements between tribal law enforcement and state patrol. Meanwhile,
Maine has a special jurisdiction arrangement with tribes pursuant to the
Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act which eliminated litigation between
the states and tribes.
Id. at 266 n.184 (internal citations omitted). Pommersheim also identified at least
seven law enforcement agreements. Id. at 265-66.
100. Id. Pommersheim found seven general environmental agreements in Wis-
consin, two in Montana, one in Idaho, two in Minnesota. Id at 266 n.186. He also
found a statute in New Mexico concerning wastewater. Id. His article also identified
eleven separate water rights agreements. Id. at 265-66. If hunting and fishing agree-
ments are included, he found that eight states have this type of agreement. Id. at 266
n.187.
101. Id. at 265-66. "Eight states have this type of agreement. Wisconsin has at
least 10 agreements in this area, while South Dakota has agreements with at least two
separate tribes." Id at 266 n.187.
102. Id. at 265-66.
Montana has eight agreements with tribes dealing with health and welfare
programs. Minnesota has one dealing with child custody. Wisconsin has
a Division of Economic Support with a Tribal Affairs Unit from which
tribes may solicit state money for federal projects such as day care, sub-
stance abuse shelters, and job programs.
Id. at 266 n.188.
103. Id. at 265-66. "These are more statutory in nature but would undoubtedly
require tribal lobbying of a state legislature to pass the state law. See OR. REV. STAT.
§ 97.740, § 390.235 (1989)." Id at 266 n.189.
104. See generally 1 COHEN, supra note 42, § 6.05 (Tribal-State Cooperative
Agreements).
105. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, TRIBAL-STATE PARTNERSHIPS: COOPERATING TO
IMPROVE INDIAN EDUCATION 1 (2000), available at http://www.narf.org/
pubs/misc/copyncaip.htm [hereinafter TRIBAL-STATE PARTNERSHIPS].
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with the remainder mostly attending public schools, half of which are off-
-106
reservation.
The number of agreements relating to education that tribes and other
sovereigns consummated is difficult to measure, in part because some agree-
ments involve broad state-level directions to local school districts to cooper-
ate as a general matter with area tribes. While Professor Pommersheim re-
ported only two such agreements in 1991, the number of such agreements has
grown substantially in the past two decades to include a broad array of specif-
ic educational issues.
Education-related agreements address funding,'0 7 sharing of student da-
ta,108 the provision of culture-specific educational services, 09 truancy," 0 in-
corporation of tribes into local school boards for contracting and govern-
ance,"' disbursement of Impact Aid funds,"l 2 programs to increase educa-
tional achievement,"l 3 special education funding and services,"l 4 transporta-
tion,115 and even tribal sponsorship of sports teams in North Dakota." 6
106. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., INDIAN NATIONS AT RISK: AN EDUCATIONAL
STRATEGY FOR ACTION 2 (1991).
107. The Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nations in North Dakota, for example,
concluded an agreement with the state in which they operate three tribal schools as
public school districts and receive state funds. TRIBAL-STATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra
note 105, at 5.
108. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe and the Navajo Nation, for example, have con-
cluded agreements with their surrounding states to ensure tribal access to data about
tribal members who are students in state and local public schools. See id. at 3.
109. One example of a cultural-specific education service is language instruction.
See RJS & Assocs., EXTERNAL EVALUATION FINAL REPORT, ROSEBUD Sioux TRIBAL
EDUCATION DEPARTMENT & TRIBAL EDUCATION CODE 8 (1999), available at
http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED463910.pdf. The Rosebud Sioux Tribe, for example,
concluded agreements with the Todd County School District and the state Tribal Edu-
cation Department and Sinte Giske University to cooperatively develop a Lakota
Studies curriculum for K- 12 schools. See id at 11.
110. The Bowler School District in Wisconsin and the Stockbridge-Munsee
Community Band of Mohican Indians have an arrangement that addresses truancy
problems. TRIBAL-STATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 105, at 3.
111. In 2000, Florida authorized the Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes to establish
governance over educational matters relating to special improvement districts under
state law. See id. at 5 (citing FLA. STAT. § 285.18 (2000)). Minnesota conferred to
White Earth Tribal Council governance over the Pine Point public school located on
the reservation. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 128B.011 (2000)). Agreements next door
in North Dakota direct state funding to operate tribal grant schools as public school
districts under state law. Id.
112. Cherokee Central Schools concluded an agreement with the local Swain
County School District, for example, in which Impact Aid funds are used by the dis-
trict to provide such services as driver's education and test scoring, while the tribe
provides language instructors for the district and their Indian students. Id. at 3.
113. The Skokomish Tribe, for example, has partnered with the Hood Canal
School District and the Superintendent of Public Instruction for Washington so that
2011] I061
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In at least one instance, a state has elevated cooperation with its tribes to
the level of a constitutional mandate. Montana's Constitution recognizes the
"unique cultural heritage of the American Indians" and declares a commit-
ment to "the preservation of their cultural integrity."' 17 This objective is re-
flected in a bill passed in 1999 requiring each school district to work "coop-
eratively with Montana tribes," or others nearby, "when providing instruction
or when implementing an educational goal or adopting a rule related to the
education of each Montana citizen, to include information specific to the cul-
tural heritage and contemporary contributions of American Indians, with par-
ticular emphasis on Montana Indian tribal groups and governments.""
The Native American Rights Fund reviews a number of cooperative
agreements relating to the education of Indian children and provides access to
the text of these agreements. 1l9 Examples include an agreement between a
reservation boarding school and the local school district in the Cheyenne-
Eagle Butte School Cooperative School Agreement, which touches on fund-
ing, personnel, curriculum, transportation, and the rights of students.1 20
the tribe is involved in boosting the educational achievement of tribal members
through curricular changes and increased family participation. Id.
114. An inter-agency Agreement between the Turtle Mountain Special Education
Department and the Turtle Mountain Agency Schools provides for the pooling of
special education resources available at the BIA school under tribal grants and con-
trol. NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, INDIAN EDUCATION LEGAL SUPPORT PROJECT:
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS IN INDIAN EDUCATION 91 (1998), available at
http://www.narforg/pubs/edulgreen.pdf [hereinafter COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS].
115. The Keams Canyon Boarding School and the Hopi Junior/Senior High
School have concluded an MOA to optimize use of school buses. Id at 37.
116. By agreement, a process was put in place to enable tribes to apply to the
North Dakota High School Activities Association to sponsor junior and high school
teams. Id. at 7.
117. MONT. CONST. art. 10, § 1.
118. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-1-501 (West, Westlaw through July 1, 2011, and all
2010 ballot measures).
119. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS, supra note 114, at 5-7.
120. Id. at 11-22. Other agreements include two between Turtle Mountain Band
of Chippewa and the Dunseith Public School District and with the Belcourt School
District, and between the Lummi Tribe and the Femdale School District. Id at 5-7.
Other tribes that have concluded agreements with state or county governments include
the Rosebud Sioux, the Navajo Nation, the Chippewa-Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's
Reservation in Montana, and the Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde Reserva-
tion in Oregon, which "work with their states, school districts, tribal colleges, and
state universities in areas of teacher training, school accreditation, youth leadership
programs, and parental, family, and community involvement programs." TRIBAL-
STATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 105, at 5.
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States and tribes frequently use intergovernmental agreements to
strengthen law enforcement and public safety for Indian and non-Indian
communities. Unfortunately, high rates of criminal victimization in Indian
Country, often of Indians by non-Indians, are frequently coupled with the
reluctance of non-Indians to prosecute.121 These realities have encouraged
the negotiation of a broad range of law enforcement intergovernmental
agreements. Now numbering more than 150 separate agreements involving
twenty-two states, their subsidiary jurisdictions, and more than seventy-five
tribes,122 these agreements exist to clarify the complex jurisdictional ques-
tions relating to law enforcement in Indian Country and to achieve greater
efficiencies in the use of law enforcement personnel and resources.123
121. See Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, Unguarded Indians: The Complete
Failure of the Post-Oliphant Guardian and the Dual-Edged Nature of Parens Patriae,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1119-20 (2010).
122. See, e.g., Law Enforcement Agreements, NAT'L CONGRESS AM. INDIANS,
http://www.ncai.org/Law-Enforcement-Agreements.100.0.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2012).
123. Such Tribal-state compacts relating to law enforcement can include mutual
aid agreements, see, for example, Grand Traverse Band, Leelanau County Sheriffs
Log (Feb. 23, 2003), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/agreements/
Grand Traverse Band Leelanau County Sheriffs Log.pdf (documenting the types of
activities in which the Grand Traverse Band Tribal Police Department and the Lee-
lanau County Sheriff provide mutual assistance for many illegal activities). Others
cover extradition (see, e.g., NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 17 § 1951 (2009)) and
the gathering and use of evidence. See, e.g., Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation,
Connecticut State Police and Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise Video/Audio
Tape Evidence Protocol (2002), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/
agreements/Mashantucket%20Pequot%20Video-Audio%20Evidence%20Protocol.
pdf. Additional compacts relating to law enforcement have been made in the area of
interagency drug interdiction and enforcement. See, e.g., Paul Bunyan Narcotics Task
Force, Inter-agency Agreement (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.ncai.
org/ncai/resource/agreements/mnlaw-paul bunyannarcotics taskforceinteragenc
y agreement betweenleechlake-band of ojibwe indians counties december_200
I.pdf (comprising five northern Minnesota counties, the city of Bemidji, their associ-
ated law enforcement agencies, and the Leech Lake Band of Ojibwe Indians).
Cross-deputization is the single most common form of intergovernmental
law enforcement agreement, at least one is in effect in most of the twenty-two states
with some type of law enforcement agreement. See Law Enforcement Agreements,
supra note 122. The Choctaws in Oklahoma, for example, have concluded that doz-
ens of cross-deputization agreements have been executed between the state, counties,
and towns, and more than 150 such agreements exist in Oklahoma alone. See Com-
pacts, Contracts, and Agreements, OKLAHOMA INDIAN AFF. COMMISSION,
http://www.ok.gov/oiac/Compacts, Contracts,_and Agreements (last visited Sept. 16,
2011) [hereinafter OKLAHOMA Compacts].
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3. Taxation
A number of tribes and states have reached intergovernmental agree-
ments related to taxation.124 Tribes enjoy an exemption from state taxes,125
which provide many substantial economic opportunities not available to the
other sovereigns within the American federalist structure. Many states, how-
ever, fear revenue loss as tribal enterprises begin to compete with non-Indian
enterprises subject to state taxation.126 Thus, states resist the expansion of
tax-exempt tribal enterprises when they can.127 Sometimes both parties per-
ceive gain in reaching a negotiated resolution.128
The State of Michigan and several tribes signed a broad taxation agree-
ment that covers use taxes, fuel taxes, income taxes, tobacco taxes, and the
Single Business Tax.129 This agreement provides for a standardization of tax
collection understandings about the disbursement of a portion of tax monies
back to the tribes and includes, under certain conditions, the waiver of sover-
eign immunity in tax matters for the tribes and the state.130
Inter-jurisdictional management of parolees, enforcement of state law related
to criminal activities and gaming, as well as the release of tribal employee records
have also been regulated by compact. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Investigation and Prosecution of Violations of Certain State Laws on
Santa Ana Pueblo Lands (Mar. 9, 2000), available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/
resource/agreements/MOU - Pueblo of Santa Ana.pdf; see also Excerpt from Ordi-
nance of Tulalip Tribes, Human Resources Ordinance, NAT'L CONGRESS AM.
INDIANS, available at http://www.ncai.org/ncai/resource/agreements/TulalipTribes
Ordinance Re Employee Records.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
124. See Tax Agreements, NAT'L CONGRESS AM. INDIANS, available at
http://www.ncai.org/Tax-Agreements.97.0.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
125. 1 COHEN, supra note 42, § 8.03[1][b].
126. See Judy Zelio, Piecing Together the State-Tribal Tax Puzzle, NAT'L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2005), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid= 12662.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Tax Agreement Between the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians and
the State of Michigan, 2 (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.michigan.gov/ doc-
uments/SaultSteFinalTaxAgreement 61197_7.pdf [hereinafter Michigan-Chippewa
Tax Agreement]. The State of Michigan concluded in 2002 a series of nearly identi-
cal tax agreements with Bay Mills Indian Community, Hannahville Indian Communi-
ty, Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians,
Nottawaseppi Huron Band of Potawatomi Indians, Pokagon Band of Potawatomi
Indians, and the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians. See, e.g., id. Apart
from an appendix precisely defining the territory in which the agreement would be in
effect, each of these agreements are identical. See State/Tribal Tax Agreements and
Amendments, ST. MICH. DEP'T TREASURY, http://www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,1607,7-
238-43513 43517---,00.html (follow hyperlinks to access tax agreements for each
community) (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
130. See Michigan-Chippewa Tax Agreement, supra note 129, at 4, 11.
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In January 2002, the State of Nebraska and the Winnebago Tribe signed
a taxation agreement governing the tribal sale of reformulated gasoline and
other petroleum products, in which the tribe collects the state tax but receives
75% back from the state.' 31 In Oklahoma, more than thirty tribes have en-
tered into agreements with the state governing the taxation of motor fuels in
the wake of a similar act by the state legislature.132
Tribal sales of tobacco often provide an attractive economic opportunity
because, under most circumstances, tribes do not have the burden of state
tobacco taxes.133 Many tribes and states, however, share concerns relating to
the health consequences of tobacco and prevention of youth smoking. States
are concerned about revenue loss as consumers shift from vendors subject to
state taxes to the tribal providers.1 34 The State of Washington and its tribes
have made several compacts relating to sharing revenues and managing the
sale of cigarettes.135 In Oklahoma, the Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Seminole
Nations also compacted with the State of Oklahoma regarding tribal sale of
tobacco products. Per the agreements, the state receives tribal tax revenues
but guarantees the tribes' taxation rates and contributions to certain pro-
grams, such as education and health care.138
4. Hunting and Fishing
Habitat co-management plans for wildlife and fishery resources are at-
tractive to the federal government, state governments, and some tribes in or-
131. Zelio, supra note 126.
132. See Motor Fuels Contracts, OKLA. INDIAN AFF. COMMIssION,
http://www.ok.gov/oiac/Compacts,_Contracts,_andAgreements/index.html#motorfu
els (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
133. See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reser-
vation, 425 U.S. 463, 479 (1976) (stating that states lack jurisdiction to impose ciga-
rette sales taxes on Indians within reservation boundaries).
134. Such a dispute is currently ongoing between tribes in New York and the
State of New York. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Gould, 930 N.E.2d 233,
234-35 (N.Y. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 353 (2010).
135. See, e.g., Cigarette Tax Contract Between the Jamestown S'Klallam Indian
Tribe and the State of Washington (2002), available at http://www.ncai.org/
ncai/resource/agreements/jamestown cigarette tax agreement.pdf.
136. Tobacco Compacts, OKLA. INDIAN AFF. COMMISSION, http://www.ok.gov/
oiac/Compacts,_Contracts,_and Agreements/index.html#tobacco (last visited Sept.
16, 2011).
137. For example, the current compact between the State of Oklahoma and the
Cherokee Nation puts forth a flat rate of $6.65 total tax per carton of cigarettes.
Council Approves Tobacco Compact, CHEROKEE NATION (Nov. 10, 2008),
http://cherokee.org/PressRoom/23805/Press Article.aspx.
138. Press Release, Andrews Davis, P.C., Seminole Nation Agrees to Tobacco
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der to better protect the animal resources Indians and non-Indians enjoy.139
These agreements pose certain risks to both parties and raise nettlesome is-
sues for tribes.140 In many cases, intergovernmental agreements can cut
through the knot of confusing jurisdictions and reduce waste in the manage-
ment of game and fish resources for the benefit of all parties.141 Intergov-
ernmental agreements also can provide tribal members with better access to
traditional hunting and fishing areas, including off-reservation sites, and can
help tribes protect reservation areas from non-Indian sportsmen. Given the
ongoing debate regarding which entity has management authority over wild-
life resources, state-tribal agreements may best meet the needs and rights of
multiple user groups. This trend will accelerate as the successes of recent
cooperative efforts become more apparent to stakeholders.
The most comprehensive compact relating to fisheries resources is the
Columbia River Compact, developed in the wake of the Boldt decisions, 142
comprising the Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission, the Washington Fish
and Wildlife Commission, and the various tribes that have developed substan-
tial fisheries. 143 This compact ensures tribal participation in decisions that
may affect their fisheries while providing an institutional mechanism for the
coordination of recovery and resource management plans and the sharing of
tribal expertise.144
Promoted by Governor Gary Locke through the Office of Indian Affairs,
the State of Washington signed a series of agreements with tribes relating to
both subsistence hunting and fishing as well as recreational fishing and hunt-
139. See generally Edmund J. Goodman, Indian Tribal Sovereignty and Water
Resources: Watersheds, Eco-Systems, and Tribal Co-Management, 20 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 185 (2000).
140. Shelly D. Stokes, Eco-System Co-Management Plans: A Sound Approach or
a Threat to Tribal Rights?, 27 VT. L. REV. 421, 421-22 (2003).
141. See Marren Sanders, Eco-System Co-Management Agreements: A Study of
Nation Building or a Lesson on Erosion of Tribal Sovereignty, 15 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J.
97, 105-07 (2007).
142. See United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980)
(Phase II), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (Phase 1), aff'd and remanded, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
143. The Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife maintains an online digital
depository of actions and deliberations by the commission. See Columbia River
Compact, WASH. DEP'T FISH & WILDLIFE, http://wdfw.wa.gov/fishing/crc/ (last visit-
ed Sept. 16, 2011).
144. See OR. FISH & WILDLIFE & WASH. DEP'T OF FISH & WILDLIFE, ACTION
NOTICE: COLUMBIA RIVER COMPACT/JOINT STATE HEARING (2011), available at
http://wdfw.wa.gov/fishing/crc/2011/crc21julllaction.pdf (regulating Treaty Indian
Summer Chinook commercial fishery activities).
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ing licenses.145 The agreements were a product of the 1999 Centennial Ac-
cords implementation plan that institutionalized a government-to-government
relationship between tribes and the state.146 The parties to the agreements
include the Departments of Ecology, Fish and Wildlife, and various tribes
across the state.147
An Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife report describes coopera-
tive agreements and efforts ranging from hydropower licensing to access to
game for ceremonial purposes, with many other cooperative efforts in be-
tween.148 Arizona has signed seventeen separate agreements with eight tribes
relating to game and fisheries management, ranging from hunting permits to
turkey capture and relocation programs, and from predator management to
wildlife law enforcement.149
D. Rationale for Compacting
At its most basic level, the availability of tribal-state cooperative agree-
ments allows the states freedom to create contracts that meet the needs of
their constituents. Without these agreements, states and their non-Indian
citizens would have no access to Indian land for non-criminal matters that
affect both groups, matters ranging from minor contractual issues such as
auto repossession to land development and zoning issues. States would also
be unable to enforce child-support agreements or have state court rulings
enforced in Indian Country. In addition to decreasing the likelihood of reach-
ing mutually satisfactory solutions to disputes, the absence of intergovern-
mental agreements would also contribute to a possible escalation to vio-
lence. 50
145. See generally DRAFT: WASH. DEP'T FISH & WILDLIFE, CENTENNIAL ACCORD
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2001), available at http://web.archive.org/web/201005
19230746/http://www.goia.wa.gov/govtogov/pdf/fish and wildlife.pdf.
146. Id. at 4. The agreements also covered employment placement in resource
management agencies, enforcement actions, formalized consultations, and dispute
resolution mechanisms. Id. at 2-3, 5. For the most recent version of the Centennial
Accord Implementation Plan, see WASH. DEP'T FISH & WILDLIFE, CENTENNIAL
ACCORD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN (2010), available at http://www.goia.wa.gov/ govto-
gov/pdf/DepartmentOfFishAndWildlife.pdf.
147. See WASH. ST. DEP'T ECOLOGY, CENTENNIAL ACCORD IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN 1 (2001), available at http://www.goia.wa.gov/govtogov/pdf/department of
ecology.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
148. OR. DEP'T FISH & WILDLIFE, ODFW AND TRIBAL PARTNERSHIPS IN 2009, 1-2
(2009), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/cis/govtogov/2009AnnualReports/
ODFW - Gov to Gov 2009 FINAL.pdf [hereinafter ODFW PARTNERSHIPS].
149. See Game & Fish, ARIZ. COMM'N INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://web.archive.org/
web/20070810102843/http://www.indianaffairs.state.az.us/agreements/gamefish.html
(last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
150. This is particularly true in cases such as repossession. Babbitt Ford, Inc. v.
Navajo Indian Tribe, 710 F.2d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A repossession without the
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One example of the need for amicable negotiation between tribes and
states occurred when the Rhode Island State Police staged an armed invasion
of the Narragansett reservation to forcibly shut down a tribal tobacco store
that was selling tobacco products without charging state sales taxes.' 5  For-
tunately, such violent confrontations are now the exception, and as tribes and
states have found ways to work together, the areas of cooperation have ex-
panded. In many instances, any political subdivision of a state can enter into
cooperative agreements with tribes in pursuit of mutual interests.152 For ex-
ample, states and tribes have used inter-jurisdictional agreements to integrate
their respective judicial systems so that the two remain separate and distinct,
supporting rather than contradicting each other.'53  States also have found
these agreements helpful in clarifying and simplifying the application of so-
cial policies, aiding the resolution of domestic disputes, and in dealing with
consent of the trib[al] member also may escalate into violence, particularly if othersjoin [in].").
151. See Gavin Clarkson, Bull Connor Would Have Been Proud, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 20, 2003, at C3, available at http://articles.courant.com/2003-07-
20/news/0307200622 I indian-tribes-indian-country-today-tribal.
152. In Oklahoma, the governor or a governing board of any political subdivision
is authorized to negotiate and enter into intergovernmental cooperative agreements
with tribal governments within the state to address issues of mutual interest. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 74, § 1221 (Westlaw through Ist Reg. Sess. of 53rd Legis. 2011). Oregon
law likewise authorizes local governments and state agencies to cooperate and enter
into agreements with tribes. OR. REv. STAT. § 190.110 (West, Westlaw through Ch.
733 of the 2011 Reg. Sess.).
153. Agreements in this area include cross recognition of judgments, full faith and
credit, comity, mutual enforcement of traffic laws, and the sharing of records, infor-
mation, reports and resources, as well as administrative issues. South Dakota's "joint
exercise of governmental powers' statute" incorporates cooperation with Indian tribes
by including them within the definition of "public agency" for the purposes of the
statute. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-24-1(2) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Exec. Order
11-1 and Sup. Ct. R. 11-17). In Arizona, counties may enter into intergovernmental
agreements with any tribal government for joint development of land and infrastruc-
ture and improvements to public facilities. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9-461.12 (Westlaw
through the 1st Reg. Sess. and 3d Special Sess. of the 50th Leg. (2011)). Idaho au-
thorizes local governments and state and public agencies to enter into agreements
with tribes for the concurrent exercise of powers and transfer of real and personal
property, and also exempts on-reservation sale of tangible property by a tribe from
state taxation. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 63-602, 67-4002 (Lexis current through 2011
Reg. Sess.). Tribes in Oklahoma have also entered into agreements with the state to
address mutual interests. OKLAHOMA Compacts, supra note 123. As of October
1999, they had jointly created thirty-one tobacco regulation compacts, eleven com-
pacts regarding gaming, twenty-four contracts regarding motor fuel, and one agree-
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issues surrounding religious practice.154 in some states, this cooperation even
extends to issues of mental health. 5 5
Although the breadth of tribal-state compacting is extensive, gaming
compacts have been the most prominent. More than twenty states have
reached gaming agreements with more than 200 tribes that the Secretary of
the Interior has approved and that operate under the oversight of the National
Indian Gaming Commission. The fact that a compact exists, however, does
not indicate that a casino is in operation, let alone profitable.' 57 As discussed
in Part IV.B, however, tribes can also offer limited forms gaming even in the
absence of a compact.' 58 In order to understand the nuances of tribal gaming
compacts, the origins of Indian gaming must be understood.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDIAN GAMING
While commercial Indian gaming operations have sprung up only in the
past quarter century, many tribes have longstanding traditions involving
games of chance.' 59  Blackfeet tradition recounts "how Na'pi (Old Man)
154. See, e.g., ODFW PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 148, at 1 (discussing agreements
regarding wildlife management in support of tribal ceremonies and celebrations).
155. In Arizona, an involuntary commitment order from a tribal court is recog-
nized as enforceable by any court of record in the state, and the Arizona Supreme
Court is free to adopt rules regarding recognition of those tribal court orders. ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 12-136.
156. The NIGC website lists compacts with 246 tribes. See Compacts, NAT'L
INDIAN GAMING COMMISSION, http://www.nigc.gov/ReadingRoom/Compacts.aspx
(last visited Feb, 5 2012); see also Gaming Compacts, NAT'L CONGRESS AM.
INDIANS, http://www.ncai.org/Gaming-Compacts.103.0.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2011). Note, however, that some of the compacts listed were not negotiated but were
rather imposed by Secretarial Procedures. See, e.g., Class Ill Gaming Procedures for
the Northern Arapaho Nation (Sept. 21, 2005), available at
http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/O/N IGC%2OUploads/readingroom/compacts/Arapaho%2
OTribe%20of/o20the%2OWind%20River%20Reservation/arapahotribeO92105.pdf;
see also infra Part V.B. discussing how the Pequots casino operation was also pursu-
ant to Secretarial Procedures.
157. The Narragansett Tribe, for example, signed a compact with the State of
Rhode Island but was subsequently ambushed by the late Senator John Chafee,
Chafee attached a "midnight rider" to an omnibus appropriations bill, Omnibus Con-
solidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 330, 110 Stat. 3009
(1996) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1708 (2006)), that made the Narragansetts
the only tribe not covered by IGRA. See Matthew Thomas, Editorial, Narragansetts
Victimized, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., July 4, 1998, at Al1.
158. The Poarch Band of Creek Indians, for example, operate a gaming facility
yet they have neither a compact nor Secretarial Procedures, Part VII.B infra discusses
these forms of Class II casinos.
159. Brian P. McClatchey, Note, A Whole New Game: Recognizing the Changing
Complexion of Indian Gaming by Removing the "Governor's Veto" for Gaming on
"After-Acquired Lands", 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1227, 1239 (2004).
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brought the tribe the hoop and arrow game.... [And how] Blackfeet continue
to play traditional betting games."' 60 The Blackfeet are not alone, as many
tribes have such traditional games. Thus Indian gaming is, in many re-
spects, a new expression of an ancient cultural practice.162
A. The Early Years
Legend has it that commercial gaming on Indian reservations in the
United States began as a response to a fire that destroyed two trailers on the
Oneida Indian reservation in Verona, New York, in 1975.163 The reservation
had neither a fire department nor firefighting equipment, and two Oneidas
perished in the blaze.'6 To prevent such tragedies in the future, the Oneidas
decided "to raise money for [their] own fire department . . . the way all the
fire departments raise money . .. [through b]ingo."l6 5 The Oneidas launched
a bingo game in a double-wide trailer, offering prizes in excess of the limits
permitted by New York law.166 The Oneidas maintained that, because they
were an Indian nation, they were not bound by state bingo regulations.
Tribe members claimed that their right of sovereignty entitled them to run
their own game and to offer a jackpot large "enough to draw non-Indians -
and their money - to a place they otherwise might never visit."' 68
Subsequently, according to one Oneida tribal member, "the Seminoles
got wind of it"l 69 and began their own high-stakes bingo game in Hollywood,
Florida, in 1979.170 The Seminole tribe contracted with a non-Indian organi-
zation to build and manage its bingo hall.17 1 The agreement called for the
managers to receive 45% of the profits after repayment of a $1 million con-
160. Brad Jolly, Note & Comment, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Un-
wavering Policy of Termination Continues, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273, 274 (1997).
161. Traditional games are denoted in IGRA as Class I gaming, which is com-
pletely beyond the reach of federal or state law. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(6), 2710(a)(1)
(2006).
162. McClatchey, supra note 159, at 1239.
163. Dennis McAuliffe, Jr., Casinos Deal Indians a Winning Hand: Billions in
Revenue Ease Tribes' Dependence on Federal Funds, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1996, at
Al. Other accounts suggest that Florida was the birthplace of Indian gaming. See
William T. Bisset, Tribal-State Gaming Compacts: The Constitutionality of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 72 (1993).





169. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. Id.
171. Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 311 (5th Cir. 1981).
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struction loan.172 The enterprise was a success, and the Seminoles repaid the
loan in less than six months.173
As tribal bingo operations grew more successful, states demanded a
cut.174 States unsuccessfully "sought to extend their laws over [tribal] lands
to . . . prohibit, regulate, and/or tax tribal bingo operations."' 75 Whereas the
district attorney in Madison County, New York, successfully shut down the
Oneidas' game, the Seminoles fought the state in the courts when Florida
authorities tried to close the Seminoles' bingo hall in 1981.176 The Seminoles
argued that Florida did not have the authority to prohibit gaming on their
reservation, and the Fifth Circuit agreed,177 relying upon Bryan v. Itasca
County, in which the Supreme Court held that if a state regulates but does not
prohibit an activity, it may not prohibit that same activity in Indian Country
under P.L. 280.178 Thus, the Seminoles secured the right to run their game
and pay out unrestricted prizes.
B. Gambling in Connecticut
In 1971, Connecticut legalized gambling when, during a fiscal crisis, the
state government passed legislation sanctioning a state lottery, off-track bet-
ting, and horse racing. 179 In 1976, the state legislature authorized betting on
greyhound racing as well as jai alai,1so and created a state-run, off-track bet-
ting system.
Despite the state's efforts to regulate gambling, Connecticut-based
greyhound racing and jai alai operations soon were enmeshed in scandal, and
172. See WILLIAM N. THOMPSON, NATIVE AMERICAN ISSUES: A REFERENCE
HANDBOOK 28 (2d ed. 2005).
173. RENEE ANN CRAMER, CASH, COLOR, AND COLONIALISM: THE POLITICS OF
TRIBAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 86 (2005).
174. See id. at 86-87.
175. McClatchey, supra note 159, at 1240; see CRAMER, supra note 173, at 86.
176. McAuliffe, supra note 163.
177. See Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that Florida had no regulatory jurisdiction over the tribe, and therefore could not
prohibit Indian gaming).
178. Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 378-81 (1976).
179. Agency History, CONN. DEP'T CONSUMER PROTECTION: GAMING DIVISION
(July 1, 2011), http://www.ct.gov/dosr/cwp/view.asp?a=3&q=290518.
180. Id. Jai alai is defined as "a court game somewhat like handball played usual-
ly by two or four players using a ball and a long curved basket strapped to the wrist."
Definition of "Jai Alai", MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/jai alai (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
18 1. Agency History, supra note 179.
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reports of misconduct surfaced frequently.182 In 1976, in response to wide-
spread corruption, the state legislature imposed a one-year moratorium on the
provision of new gambling licenses.183
Nonetheless, illegal activity continued to plague Connecticut gambling.
In 1979, the government appointed a grand jury to investigate betting irregu-
larities at the state's three jai alai frontons.' 84 The probe led to the first arrests
and convictions of players and bettors for fixing games in the forty-five-year
history of jai alai in the United States. as In May 1979, the legislature "im-
pose[d] a two-year moratorium on [any] new racing, jai alai and off-track
betting facilities"1 86 and repeatedly extended the moratorium during the
1980s.187
Despite corruption, legal gambling became a popular activity for con-
sumers and a lucrative revenue source for the state. In the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1992, gamblers wagered $1 billion in Connecticut on state-
sanctioned games. Gaming and Wagering Business magazine ranked the
state sixth in the nation in per capita wagering.189
C. Gambling on the Pequot Reservation
A Pequot tribal council first raised the prospect of gambling on the
tribe's reservation at a tribal council meeting in 1984 when several members
proposed the establishment of a high-stakes bingo game. 190 According to
tribal chairman Richard Hayward, however, the council rejected the proposal
out of concern for the "elements" that gambling might attract.' 9' The follow-
ing year, though, the tribal council decided to support a bingo operation.192
As Hayward pointed out, "[C]onsidering the fact that the federal government
supports these activities on Indian reservations to raise money to support oth-
182. Lyn Bixby, 25 Years of Gambling in Connecticut, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb.




185. See Robert Boyle & Nancy Williamson, The Spreading Scandal in Jai Alai,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 11, 1979, at 28, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.
com/vaultlarticle/magazine/MAG 1095023/index.htm.
186. Bixby, supra note 182.
187. Id.
188. George Judson, For Connecticut, the Stakes Are Not Just on the Tables, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
1992/12/25/nyregion/for-connecticut-the-stakes-are-not-just-on-the-tables.html.
189. Id.
190. McCarthy, supra note 31.
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er businesses, we decided to go for it."1 93 Bingo, he remarked, was "a rapid
way to raise capital."l94
Connecticut law, however, limited total daily prizes awarded by a bingo
hall to $500.' In 1985, the Pequots filed suit in federal court challenging the
state limit on bingo prizes.196 The court ruled that state laws governing bingo
were regulatory, not criminal, and as such were unenforceable on Indian res-
ervations.' 97 Additionally, the court held that the state could not deny Indians
the right to profit from gambling when the state was doing so.'9 Over the
next six months, the tribe spent $4.5 million to build a high-stakes bingo hall,
which opened on July 5, 1986.199 Running the game five nights per week and
paying out more than $10,000 in nightly prizes, the Pequots attracted capacity
crowds of nearly 1700 people.2o Participation was not limited to local resi-
dents; many bingo players arrived in buses from all over New England.201
Wary of their lack of experience in operating a bingo game, the Pequots
contracted with the Penobscot Tribe of Maine to run the game for three
years.202 The Penobscots, who had run a high-stakes game on their own res-
ervation near Bangor, contracted for a share of the proceeds.203
In December 1987, the Pequots' bingo game was generating revenue of
approximately $10 million per year, and the Pequots' share of bingo profits
204
amounted to about $2 million, half the tribe's annual income. Bingo eam-
ings allowed the Pequots to reacquire land adjoining the reservation205 that
had been lost over time.206 By late 1991, 165 tribe members lived on the
reservation in thirty-five houses and two small apartment buildings on a small
comer of the 1800-acre reservation. 207
193. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 7-169(i) (1974), invalidated by Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F. Supp. 245 (D. Conn. 1986).
196. See Mashantucket, 626 F. Supp. 245.
197. Id. at 249.
198. Id
199. Robert A. Hamilton, Tribe's Bingo Lures Eager Crowds, N.Y. TIMES, July
20, 1986, § 1ICN, at 1.
200. Dirk Johnson, Tribe's Latest Enterprise: Bingo, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1986, §




203. Indian Bingo Plan Stymies Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1984, § 1, at 70.
204. Ravo, supra note 36.
205. Waldman, Return to Heritage, supra note 28.
206. See supra Part II.A. for a discussion of the loss of Pequot lands.
207. See Waldman, Return to Heritage, supra note 28.
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D. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
The Oneida reservation in New York may have been Indian gaming's
modem birthplace, but the first case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court came
from California. The Court held that states cannot ban or regulate the con-
duct of Indian gaming operations on reservations without explicit congres-
sional consent.208 In applying the holding of its earlier decision in Bryan v.
Itasca County,209 the Court found that although Public Law 280210 granted
certain states211 civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands, Public Law
280 did not grant total civil jurisdiction.212 Instead, it granted jurisdiction to
213
adjudicate civil disputes in Indian Country. The crucial test in Bryan was
whether the regulation at issue was civil and regulatory or criminal and pro-
214hibitory. In applying this test, the Court held that because California al-
lowed some forms of gambling, extending that state's laws over the gaming
operations of the Cabazon and Morongo Bands of Mission Indians would
amount to an exercise of power that was civil and regulatory, rather than
215
criminal and prohibitory. As such, California's bingo laws were not appli-
cable to the gaming operations on Indian lands in California.216
Although California had an interest in preventing unscrupulous persons
from participating in gambling, the federal and tribal interests in tribal self-
determination and economic self-sufficiency were stronger: "Self-
208. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 214-16
(1987).
209. Id. at 207-08 (citing Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373 (1976)).
210. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2006)).
Each of the States listed . . . shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of ac-
tion between Indians or to which Indians are parties which arise in the ar-
eas of Indian country listed . . . to the same extent that such State has ju-
risdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such
State that are of general application to private persons or private proper-
ty shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they
have elsewhere within the State ....
Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court, upon examining the legislative history of
Public Law 280, found that the intent of Congress was to apply the state rules of deci-
sion in Indian Country, not to confer total jurisdiction over Indian lands. See Bryan,
426 U.S. at 383-85.
211. The states that 'opted into' Public Law 83-280 were Alaska, California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a). Alaska was
added in 1958. See Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-615, 72 Stat. 545 (amending
28 U.S.C. § 1360 by adding Alaska).
212. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208.
213. Id.
214. See Bryan, 426 U.S. at 380-81.
215. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 221-22.
216. Id. at 210-11.
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determination and economic development are not within reach if the Tribes
cannot raise revenues and provide employment for their members. The
Tribes' interests obviously parallel the federal interests."217 The tribes have
long needed a method of economic development, and gaming provided it.
Faced with the alignment of the interests of the tribes and the federal gov-
ernment, the state's interests had to give way.
E. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
Congress was not content to sit still as the Indian gaming phenomenon
took shape, particularly after Cabazon. During the 1980s, declining federal
financial assistance had motivated many tribes to pursue new revenue sources
that they could control, and high-stakes bingo was an obvious choice for
tribes after the Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth decision.218 By 1988, tribes
were sponsoring over 100 gaming operations generating in excess of $100
million annually.2 19 In 1986, the House of Representatives passed a bill in an
attempt to control some types of gambling on reservations.220 The bill died in
the Senate, but congressional efforts to regulate Indian gaming continued. 22 1
The two primary legislative approaches illustrated the split between the De-
partment of the Interior, favoring gaming as an engine of economic develop-
ment, and the Department of Justice, favoring those states hoping to subject
tribal gaming to their authority.
Following Cabazon, many states, as well as non-Indian gaming inter-
ests, feared a rapid expansion of Indian gaming.222 Therefore they applied
pressure on Congress to impose additional regulatory control over Indian
223gaming. States that relied on gaming for revenue feared competitors that
224did not have to pay state taxes. Other states feared that Indian gaming op-
erations, free of the requirements faced by non-Indian concerns, enjoyed too
great a competitive advantage. 225 States that prohibited gaming altogether
feared the social consequences of widespread gaming. Indian Country lob-
bied to protect this important economic development opportunity for tribes
and to protect Indian gaming from state regulation and taxation.226 Several
pressures, including the immediate response of the states to Cabazon, com-
217. Id.
218. Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310, 316-17 (5th Cir. 1981).
219. Martha Angle, High-Stakes Bingo to Continue: Congress Clears Legislation
To Regulate Indian Gambling, CQ WEEKLY REP., Oct. 1, 1988, at 2730.
220. Id.
22 1. Id.
222. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 116-17.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See id. at 117.
226. See id. at 116-18.
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bined to maneuver Congress toward a legislative compromise in the form of
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (IGRA). 2 27
Today, IGRA regulates all Indian gaming and provides the framework
for the agreements that tribes and states negotiate to facilitate gaming. 228
Meant to achieve "a principal goal of Federal Indian policy [which] is to
promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong trib-
al government,"229 IGRA mirrors the Supreme Court's holding in Cabazon
that "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on
Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal
law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal
law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity." 230
Created under Congress' Indian Commerce Clause 231 power, IGRA
preempts state prohibition or regulation of Indian gaming on Indian land2 32
and was held constitutional in Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Swim-
mer.233 Although IGRA seems to have settled many matters, states, tribes,
and the federal government often still disagree over its application. 234
227. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2006)). In fact, S. 555, which be-
came the IGRA, was under discussion at the same time that the Supreme Court was
hearing Cabazon. McClatchey, supra note 159, at 1242. "It seems clear that Con-
gress' speedy action on IGRA was motivated, at least in part, by the potential willing-
ness of the Court to support a regime of tribal gaming nearly unfettered by state [gov-
ernment] regulation." Id
228. "Referred to in [the Act] as 'tribal-state gaming compacts,' presumably the
terminology is meant to provide an analogue to contract law. Individuals and entities
enter into contracts (legally enforceable agreements); states enter into compacts
(agreements between sovereigns)." Id.
229. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(4).
230. Id. § 2701(5).
231. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. See Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians
v. State, 800 F. Supp. 1484, 1489 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (stating that, unlike Congres-
sional legislation under the Interstate Commerce Clause, Congress may not abrogate
state immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment by legislating under the
Indian Commerce Clause).
232. See Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1109
(8th Cir. 1999); see also Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536,
544 (8th Cir. 1996). But see Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 951 F.2d 757,
764-65 (7th Cir. 1991); see also S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3076 (stating that the Act is to be construed to completely
preempt the field of Indian gaming).
233. 740 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D.D.C. 1990).
234. See State v. Ysleta del sur Pueblo, 220 F. Supp. 2d 668, 693-94 (W.D. Tex.
2001) (holding essentially that Texas law, rather than IGRA, governs Indian gambling
questions, since the tribe's government is based on the Restoration Act, which was
passed prior to IGRA), modified by 220 F. Supp. 2d 668, 698-709 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
But see Gila River Indian Cmty. v. Waddell, 91 F.3d 1232, 1239-49 (9th Cir. 1996)
(affirming the notion in Cabazon that state regulation having a substantial effect on
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The Act's purpose was to provide the framework for gaming on Indian
reservations, to regulate Indian gaming, and to allay concerns that organized
crime would find a haven on Indian reservations, which some viewed as law-
less enclaves. 235 Importantly, Congress has recognized that gaming is "an
economic activity that Indian tribes can develop and that [the tribes] should
be the primary beneficiary of their efforts."236
IGRA's "Declaration of Policy" reflects the three major concerns behind
237its adoption. First, Congress wished to relieve the federal government of
some of its financial obligations to tribes by promoting economic develop-
ment and self-sufficiency through gaming revenues.238 Second, Congress
believed federal regulation of Indian gaming was required to "shield it from
organized crime" and to ensure that tribal members were the primary benefi-
239
ciaries of gaming revenue. Third, Congress desired to establish an inde-
pendent regulatory agency, the National Indian Gaming Commission,240 with
oversight authority to define and enforce national standards. Part of that
standardization involved the classification of gaming operations:
the tribal government's ability to provide for itself is a factor to be used in considering
whether a state government may impose its regulations on transactions in Indian
Country).
235. What remains to be shown is how Indian reservations can remain such "en-
claves of lawlessness" when both the state (in Public Law 280 states and states with
cross-deputization and other law enforcement agreements with tribes) and federal
(under the Assimilative Crimes Act, General Crimes Act, and the Major Crimes Act)
governments, in addition to the tribal governments, have criminal jurisdiction over
Indian Country. McClatchey, supra note 159, at 1243-44. "One would think that
organized crime would want to operate anywhere but an Indian reservation," since
reservations have three, instead of two, sovereigns on guard. Id. at 1274. "Neverthe-
less, the notion ... that organized crime will take over Indian gaming [lives on]." Id.
at 1274. Given the specter of organized crime hanging over Indian gaming, however,
opponents who invoke it have never been able to cite to a proven instance of infiltra-
tion. Indian Casinos Draw Scrutiny; Congress: Regulations Needed to Stem Orga-
nized Crime, TULSA WORLD, Oct. 31, 1997, at E8. Speaking about the threat orga-
nized crime posed to casinos, Sen. John McCain said, "The absence of federal stand-
ards has allowed a void to develop which will become more and more attractive to
criminal elements." Id. (internal citations omitted).
236. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; Role and Functioning of the National Indian
Gaming Commission, Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. I
(2003) (statement of Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Chairman, S. Comm. on Indian
Affairs).
237. See 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006).
238. Id. § 2702(1).
239. Id. § 2702(2).
240. Id. § 2702(3).
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* Class I gaming encompasses traditional games used in ceremo-
nial and social settings241 that are outside the scope of any but trib-
al regulation and control.242
* Class 11 gaming includes "the game of chance commonly known
as bingo . . . including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs,
lotto, punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other games similar
to bingo."243 Importantly, such games may still be defined as Class
11 even if they are played using a computer, an electronic device, or
other technologic aid.244 Also included in Class I are card games
"not explicitly prohibited" by the state, provided they are otherwise
in conformity with all state laws and regulations.245 Excluded from
Class 11 are "banking card games" (e.g. baccarat, blackjack) and
"electronic . . . facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines
of any kind." 24 6
* Class III gaming consists of all gaming that is not class I or 11.247
This class is the area of most contention since it is the most profit-
able class of gaming.248 This class includes so-called "Vegas-
style" games, such as house-banked card games,249 roulette, slot
machines, and the like.250
Under IGRA, Class III gaming operations also must be "conducted in
conformance with a Tribal-State compact." 25 1 IGRA notes that such com-
pacts may provide for "the assessment by the state of such activities in such
241. Id. § 2703(6).
242. Id. § 2710(a)(1).
243. Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i).
244. Id.
245. See id § 2703(7)(A)(ii)(ll).
246. Id. § 2703(7)(B)(i)-(ii).
247. Id. § 2703(8).
248. According to the information reported by the National Indian Gaming Com-
mission in 1996, the median revenue for class II operations was $4.6 million, while
the median revenue for class Ill operations was $14.4 million. Letter from Natwar M.
Gandhi, Assoc. Dir., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Bill Archer, Chairman, Com-
mittee on Ways and Means (Aug. 20, 1996), http://archive.gao.gov/paprpdfl/157511.
pdf.
249. In house-banked games, players can win money from the house; by contrast,
player-banked games only allow players to win from each other. WILLIAM N.
THOMPSON, GAMBLING IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY, ISSUES, AND
SOCIETY 188, 292-93 (2001).
250. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)-(8); Frequently Asked Questions, NAT'L INDIAN
GAMING COMMISSION, http://www.nigc.gov/About US/FrequentlyAsked_ Ques-
tions.aspx (last visited Sept. 17, 2011).
251. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).
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amounts as are necessary to defray the costs of regulating such activity."252
However,
nothing in this section shall be interpreted as conferring upon a
State or any of its political subdivisions authority to impose any
tax, fee, charge, or other assessment upon an Indian tribe or upon
any other person or entity authorized by an Indian tribe to engage
in a class III [gaming] activity.25 3
Further, "[n]o State may refuse to enter into the negotiations [for a gaming
compact] based upon the lack of authority . . . to impose such a tax, fee,
charge, or other assessment." 254
The tribe initiates the compacting process by requesting that the state in
which the casino is to be located negotiate a tribal-state compact outlining the
terms of such gaming.255 If the state agrees to negotiate, the parties have
sixty days to come to an agreement.256 The compact is then submitted to the
257Secretary of the Interior for approval. If the parties cannot reach an agree-
ment, mechanisms exist for developing procedures to regulate gaming opera-
258tions on a given reservation, even in the absence of a compact. As origi-
nally enacted, IGRA required that the states bargain in good faith regarding
the content of gaming compactS259 and gave tribes a federal cause of action to
compel negotiation once 180 days had passed from the original request.260
252. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(iii).
253. Id. § 2710(d)(4).
254. Id.
255. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
256. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii), invalidated by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996).
257. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B).
258. If the parties cannot reach agreement, they are to forward their "last best"
offers to a mediator, who will choose the best proposal of the two, and present it to
the parties for consideration. 25 C.F.R. § 291.10 (2011). Sixty days after the media-
tor's presentation of the proposal, if the parties still do not agree, the mediator is to
notify the Secretary of the Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii), invalidated by
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The Secretary will request from the
tribe specific information regarding its proposal, and will promulgate a procedure for
the tribe to operate class Ill gaming on the tribe's lands. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii)(l)-
(LI).
259. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (d)(3)(A) ("[T]he State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe
in good faith to enter into such a compact.").
260. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(A)-(B), invalidated by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44 (1996). However, the Supreme Court substantially altered this provision in Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida holding as unconstitutional § 2710(d)(7)'s authorization to bring
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IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TRIBAL STATE NEGOTIATIONS
Whenever a tribe's success depends on the decisions and actions of oth-
er governmental parties who have different interests, negotiation or negotia-
tion-like processes may be inevitable. Although gaming compacts, such as
the agreement between Connecticut and the Pequots, garner most of the head-
lines, negotiated agreements between tribes and states that resolve jurisdic-
tional or substantive disputes and recognize each entity's sovereignty can
cover a wide range of issues. The processes of interaction range from formal
to informal and from explicit to tacit. The goal of the processes may be
reaching a legally binding compact or arriving at a temporary mutual under-
standing subject to renegotiation.
Broadly speaking, negotiation is a process of potentially opportunistic
interaction aimed at advancing the full set of one's interests by jointly decid-
ed action. To be effective at negotiating, the tribe must persuade the state to
say "yes" to a proposal that also meets all of the tribe's real interests and
mean it. Of course, the state is trying to accomplish the same objective. Ba-
sically, each side is trying to solve its "Basic Negotiation Problem," which is
how best to advance one's full interests, either by improving and accepting
the available deal or opting for its best no-deal alternative.
Three core elements make up each side's Basic Negotiation Problem:
(1) the importance of underlying interests as the raw material for negotiation;
(2) the implication that negotiation is a means for advancing interests, rather
than an end in itself, implying that other non-cooperative means compete with
negotiated possibilities; and (3) the fact that negotiation seeks jointly-decided
action and thus inherently is a process of joint problem-solving. Essentially,
to advance the tribe's real interests, tribal negotiators must assess what "yes"
they want from the state and why the state might say it rather than opt for no
deal. Thus, the tribe's approach should influence how the state sees its Basic
Negotiation Problem such that what the state chooses - for the tribe's reasons
- is precisely what serves the tribe's interests. The fundamental principle of
effective negotiation, paraphrasing the words of an Italian diplomat, is "the
art of letting them have your way" for reasons that they perceive to be their
own.261
A. Interests: The Raw Material for Negotiation
The concept of "interests" is foundational to effective negotiation. Trib-
al interests in a negotiation are whatever the tribe cares about that is at stake
in the process. Socrates' admonition to "know thyself' lies at the core of
effective deal making, along with its worthy twin to "know thy counterpart."
Since negotiation requires at least two parties to say "yes" for a deal, the tribe
must probe the full set of the other parties' interests and also examine its own,
261. WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No 3 (1993) (quoting Daniele Vare).
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in addition to examining tribal interests. The best negotiators are clear on
their ultimate interests and other side's interests. They also know their possi-
ble trade-offs among lesser interests and are flexible and creative on the
means.
Interests visible at the surface may hide deeper interests that could be
critical to a successful negotiation, so good negotiators also probe negotiating
positions to identify and understand those deeper interests. Issues are on the
table for explicit agreement. Positions are each party's stands on the issues.
Interests are the underlying concerns that resolution ultimately affects.
Consider an example involving a power company that proposed building
a significant dam to bring electricity at lower rates to the area's consumers
and to demonstrate to the financial community that it could get large projects
completed despite having been repeatedly stymied in these efforts. Predicta-
bly, environmentalists opposed this plan, claiming that it would damage the
downstream habitat of the endangered whooping crane. Farm groups also
lined up against the project, fearing that the dam would reduce water flow in
the area, yet the power company needed results and a greener image. The
issue was the dam; positions on that issue were "absolutely yes" and "no
way." Yet, incompatible positions masked compatible interests. Although
years of negotiations among these groups focused on their conflicting posi-
tions, the parties ultimately reached an agreement for a smaller dam, stream-
flow guarantees, and a trust fund for preserving the downstream and other
endangered habitats of the whooping crane. Rather than a convergence of
positions, this agreement represented a reconciliation of interests.
While neglecting to think through the perspective of the other side is an
error, a related problem is to assume that one side's interests are the opposite
of the other side's interests. Psychologists who have studied negotiating be-
havior have discovered this assumption to be a pervasive tendency and dub it
the "mythical fixed pie."262 Yet, in looking for a richer set of interests of all
sides behind their incompatible positions, the differences of interest point the
way to mutual advantage, thereby expanding the pie.
In a simple example, two siblings quarrel over where to cut an orange
(the issue), with each demanding three-quarters of it (their incompatible posi-
tions). Yet, if one turns out to be hungry while the other sibling needs flavor-
ing for a recipe (their underlying interests), the siblings can devise a creative
solution that meets both interests: the orange can be peeled with the fruit go-
ing to the hungry one and the rind to the cook. By discovering that one sib-
ling was hungry while the other sibling needed flavoring, both siblings can be
made better off because of the difference in their underlying interests.
In short, interests constitute the raw material for negotiation. Tribal ne-
gotiators should assess and attach priorities to the full set of tribal interests,
not a narrow subset. Similarly, they should not only assess tribal interests but
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also the full set of the other side's interests, including relevant internal par-
ties. Further, the underlying interests of each side must be distinguished from
the issues on the table for negotiation and the positions, the parties take on
those issues. Rather than asking, "What's your position?" and asserting,
"Here's our position," negotiators should instead seek directly and indirectly
to understand what real interests lie behind those positions. Finally, the par-
ties should not stop with shared interests but instead seek complementary
diferences that can be dovetailed into joint gains.
B. Negotiation as a Means ofAdvancing Interests
Apart from what different tactics and approaches may yield at the bar-
gaining table, a crucial question involves what Fisher and Ury have dubbed
each side's BATNA, or Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement.263 The
BATNA, or no-agreement alternative, reflects the course of action a party
would take if the proposed deal were not possible. Depending on the situa-
tion, one party's BATNA may involve walking away without any agreement
or going to court rather than settling. It also may involve forming a different
coalition or alliance, going on strike, and any number of other contextual
alternatives to negotiation. If asked to agree to a particular deal, assessing the
BATNA sharpens the decision by asking "as compared to what?"
The value of the BATNA to the tribe sets the threshold of the full set of
its interests that any acceptable agreement must exceed. Similarly, the state
will have its own BATNA. Doing "better" in terms of each party's interests
compared to the BATNA is a necessary condition for an agreement. As such,
BATNAs imply the existence or absence of a Zone Of Possible Agreement
264(ZOPA) and determine its location. Of course, each side knows only its
own limits and must assess and update its assessment of the other side's
BATNA. And, in practice, many negotiators have a hazy sense of their own
BATNAs.
Improving one's own BATNA or worsening the other side's BATNA
often influences the outcome of the negotiation. The better one side's
BATNA appears to it and the other party, the more credible the threat is to
walk away unless the deal is improved. Instead of further refining tactics at
the table, parties sometimes should act away from the table to improve their
BATNA. Thus, an analysis of BATNAs fumishes an important guide to the
potential role for negotiation as well as the extent to which each side should
spend scarce resources at the table trying to improve a potential deal or away
from the table seeking a better one.
263. ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES 102 (3d ed. 2011).
264. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 19 (2000).
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C. Negotiation as a Joint Problem-Solving Process
Many problems are single decision-maker situations where the judg-
ments or actions of others should not affect an individual's judgments or ac-
tions. Yet, negotiation distinguishes itself from such problems by the parties'
interdependence. The actions of each side leading to agreement have the
potential to affect the outcome; thus their interaction leads to a joint decision-
making process.
Each side faces the same basic negotiation problem: given the choice of
agreement or no agreement, how can one best advance the full set of his or
her own interests relative to the best no-agreement alternative. The other
party's problem is a mirror image: by the choice of agreement or no agree-
ment, how can they best advance the full set of their interests relative to their
BATNA? Since they will say yes for their reasons and not for their counter-
part's reasons, agreement means joint problem-solving, addressing their prob-
lem as a means to solving one's own. In these terms, the essential task is
getting the state to see the basic elements of their problem such that the
tribe's preferred agreement is what the state chooses for its own reasons. In
this sense, negotiation is a form of "selfish altruism," or using the solution to
the state's problem as the route to solving the tribe's problem.
Remembering that negotiation is the "art of letting them have your
way,"265 the challenge is to try to shape how the other side sees their problem
such that they choose what you want. To change the other side's mind, it is
important to know where their mind is now. Then it is possible to build what
classic Chinese strategist Sun Tzu calls a "golden bridge" from where they
266
now are to where you want them to be.
In sum, the fact that negotiation is inherently a joint problem-solving
exercise should ensure that solving one side's problem - as they see it or can
be induced to see it - is a part of solving the problem of the other side. Hav-
ing assessed the full set of each side's interests, as distinct from their posi-
tions, and having estimated their BATNAs, the Fundamental Principle of
effective negotiation points to the essential strategy: shape how the other par-
ties see their Basic Problem such that, for their reasons, they choose what
your side wants.
265. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
266. Actually, in The Art of War, Sun Tzu suggested to show your opponent there
is a road to safety, although the "golden bridge" concept is often attributed to him.
See SUN Tzu, THE ILLUSTRATED ART OF WAR 168 (Samuel B. Griffith trans., Oxford
University Press 2005) (n.d.). ("Show him there is a road to safety, and so create in
his mind the idea that there is an alternative to death."). Some people identify the
concept as "Scipio's Maxim," attributing its origin to Scipio Africanus. See PETER G.
TsOuRAS, WARRIOR'S WORDS: A QUOTATION BOOK 194 (1992). Napoleon is appar-
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D. Developing a Negotiation Strategy
The core concepts - interests, BATNAs, and joint problem solving -
play roles within a larger framework of negotiation analysis. Solving the
joint problem requires both creating and claiming value on a sustainable ba-
sis. "Creating value" means "expanding the pie" or increasing the worth of
the agreement to each side beyond what was otherwise available. "Claiming
value" means distributing or apportioning that value among the parties. By
being "on a sustainable basis," an agreement is more valuable to the extent it
endures and remains healthy. Moreover, the bargaining techniques employed
should not damage the party's reputation and undercut its capacity to negoti-
ate in the future.
To facilitate this goal, Lax and Sebenius have developed a "3-D negoti-
ating strategy," which involves acting in a mutually reinforcing way among
three core dimensions of the joint problem: (1) during the interpersonal pro-
cess "at the table," (2) with respect to the substance of value creation, and (3)
"away from the table" to change the game so it is most likely to yield opti-
mum results.267 This strategy is not a recipe or a sequential approach whose
"dimensions" are independent of one another.268 Instead, the approach in-
volves cycling through these factors on a provisional basis to determine the
most relevant and promising.269 Then, as analysis deepens and the process
unfolds, the negotiator needs to update their assessments and overall negotiat-
ing approach.270 A framework leading to an effective 3-D strategy starts with
an overview of the relevant context and then assesses both the opportunities
271for and barriers to creating and claiming value. Barriers and opportunities
arise as a function of the structural, personal, and ordered aspects of the situa-
tion.
E. Using the Framework for Analysis
Although the Lax and Sebenius framework gives prescriptive advice for
approaching a negotiation, it also provides useful tools for analyzing a con-
cluded negotiation. The next two Parts will apply their framework to the
negotiations between the Pequots and the State of Connecticut. In Part V, the
negotiations retell the first part of the Foxwoods story regarding the original
gaming compact, and Part VI examines the subsequent negotiations over in-
stalling slot machines at the casino.
267. See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, 3-D NEGOTIATION 37-44 (2006).
268. See id. at 37-38.
269. See id. at 49.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 18, 49.
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V. ROUND 1: THE INITIAL CASINO NEGOTIATIONS 27 2
In early 1989, after the passage of IGRA, the Pequots announced that
they intended to build a casino alongside their bingo hall.273 The tribe sought
274to negotiate a compact with the State of Connecticut, but officials declined.
The attorney general took the position that Connecticut law did not allow
casino gambling, and thus the state could not grant the tribe's request for a
compact.275 Connecticut law, however, did allow "Las Vegas nights," fund-
raisers run by non-profit or charitable organizations that featured casino
276games such as blackjack and roulette. At "Las Vegas nights," participants
gambled with play money and used their winnings to bid for prizes.277 The
Pequots argued that, if the state permitted other organizations to run casino-
type games, the tribe had the legal right under the IGRA to do so.278 To force
the state government to the negotiating table, the Pequots filed suit against
Connecticut on November 3, 1989.279 The stage was set for the first battle for
the Foxwoods casino.
A. Context of the Initial Negotiations
When approaching a negotiation, the parties must address its relevant
context. A non-exclusive list of contextual factors includes economic, com-
petitive, historical, political, institutional, and organizational matters. A good
assessment of the setting is neither complete nor exhaustive but gives a useful
sense of the involved and potentially involved parties, perceptions of their
interests, and the nature of the process by which they are interacting. In
short, assessing a negotiation's relevant context entails looking at the setting
to see its implications for structure and psychology as well as the elements
available for efforts to change the game.
The Mashantucket Pequots and the State of Connecticut were primary
stakeholders in the litigation, but other significant parties played a role in the
outcome. Spearheading the Pequots' legal effort was Tureen & Margolin, a
272. Although much of this story is known throughout Indian Country, many of
the details are not widely known. Many of those details were discussed in a telephone
interview on February 11, 2004 with Michael Brown. See Telephone Interview with
Michael Brown, former CEO, Foxwoods Resorts (Feb. 11, 2004).
273. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. State, 737 F. Supp. 169, 170 (D. Conn. 1989),
aff'd, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990).
274. Id.
275. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 127-128.
276. Don Noel, Editorial, Charity Games Aren't Worth the Price, HARTFORD
COURANT, Apr. 5, 1993, at C9.
277. Id.
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six-member law firm in Portland, Maine, that specialized in Indian affairs.280
Thomas Tureen and Barry Margolin founded the firm in 1981, shortly after
the pair, legal aid attorneys in their thirties, won a historic $81.5 million set-
tlement for two Maine Indian tribes in a land-claim case.2 8 1 Afterwards, the
two lawyers, who earned no fees in the case, decided to establish a private
282
practice. Their firm soon became general counsel not only to the two tribes
Tureen and Margolin had represented in Maine but also to the Mashantucket
Pequots.283
Tureen & Margolin had ample experience representing American Indi-
ans but none in the casino business.284 One of the firm's associates, however,
had worked for former New Jersey Attorney General John Degnan, who had
extensive experience in casino regulation.285 This associate, Robert Gips,
recommended that the Pequots hire his former boss to help negotiate a com-
pact with the state.286 Degnan advised, however, that if the Pequots were to
move forward with their casino project, the tribe needed someone with even
more experience in casino regulation and operations, and he suggested Mi-
chael Brown.287
Having successfully prosecuted key members of New Jersey's Genovese
crime family, Brown served as director of New Jersey's Division of Gaming
218Enforcement from 1980 until 1982. During his tenure, Brown oversaw the
opening of seven casinos and supervised the initial licensing hearings for five
others.289
As a gaming regulator, Brown learned that modern casinos were not the
corrupt, mob-run operations reminiscent of the early gambling days in Neva-
da.290 Brown said, "Some of the companies, I started to realize, had devel-
oped a corporate attitude toward gaming .... They were run by people with
MBAs, not broken noses." 291
280. Id. at 169.
281. Kathleen Bird, Indian Tribe Turns to NJ Lawyers for Casino Help, N.J. L.J.,





286. Nathan Cobb, Betting on the Future: For the Mashantucket Pequots of
Southeastern Connecticut, the Foxwoods Casino Is a Way to Bring Jobs and Better
Housing to the Tribe and to Restore Its Role as an Economic Power. It Is a Way to
Survive, Bos. GLOBE, Mar. 1, 1992, at 14.
287. Id. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 144.
288. See Bird, supra note 281; Hilary Waldman, Casino Appoints Former Skeptic
on Gaming, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 10, 1993, at Bl.
289. Waldman, supra note 288.
290. Id.
291. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
1086 [Vol. 76
42
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 76, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol76/iss4/3
LEVERAGING TRIBAL SO VEREIGNTY
After speaking with Gips, Brown agreed to join the Pequots' effort to
292
open a casino. By the time Brown joined the Pequot team, a legal battle
between the Pequots and the State of Connecticut was well under way. In
March 1989 the Pequots requested that state officials negotiate a gambling
compact with them.293 Because Connecticut permitted gambling, albeit not-
for-profit, pursuant to IGRA the state was required to entertain the Pequots'
request and negotiate a compact.294 Connecticut officials refused to negoti-
ate, however, claiming that Connecticut laws prohibited gambling covered by
IGRA. 29 5
Subsequently, in November 1989, Gips and partner Barry Margolin sued
296the state in U.S. District Court in Hartford on behalf of the Pequots. They
claimed that the state had failed to negotiate in good faith with the tribe. 297
They argued before U.S. district court judge Peter Dorsey that Indian gam-
bling was permissible because the state allowed charitable organizations to
run casino games at "Las Vegas night" fund-raisers.298 In May 1990, Dorsey
ruled in the Pequots' favor and ordered the state to negotiate a compact with
the tribe within sixty days.299 Connecticut officials appealed the ruling to the
Second U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New York, but lost again.300 Bound
by Judge Dorsey's ruling, state officials began to negotiate a compact with
the Pequots, who by this time had hired Michael Brown as their chief negotia-
tor.30 1
When the court ordered Connecticut to negotiate a compact with the Pe-
quots, the governor instructed his attorney general and the state police de-
partment to locate an expert on gambling regulation. 302 The attorney general
approached his counterpart in New Jersey, while the Connecticut state police
contacted New Jersey's police headquarters 303 ronically, New Jersey's at-
torney general and the state's police force recommended Michael Brown,
because he had over ten years of experience in the industry, would never do
292. Cobb, supra note 286.
293. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. State, 737 F. Supp. 169, 170 (D. Conn. 1989),
aff'd, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1990).
294. See id. at 176.
295. Id. at 170, 172-73.
296. Id. at 169, 171.
297. Id. at 171.
298. Id. at 173.
299. Id. at 170.
300. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.
1990), aff'g 737 F. Supp. 169 (D. Conn. 1989).
301. Waldman, supra note 288; see EISLER, supra note 9, at 147-48, 153.
302. Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272. Note that the
Governor at this point was Governor O'Neill. Governor Weicker and Attorney Gen-
eral Blumenthal were both elected in November, 1990, six months after Judge
Dorsey's ruling. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 130-31.
303. Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272.
2011] 1087
43
Clarkson and Sebenius: Clarkson: Leveraging Tribal Sovereignty
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
anything to tarnish the gambling business or undermine the state, and was
trustworthy. 3 Soon, the governor and his staff discovered that the Pequots
had already retained Brown.305 Nonetheless, the state often turned to Brown
for advice in structuring regulatory proposals for the casino. 306
Outside gaming interests, particularly from Nevada and Atlantic City,
also were lurking in the background, fearful that a Pequot victory would open
307the floodgates for Indian casinos in other parts of the country. Further, the
local towns near the reservation, bitter over being "blindsided" by the initial
Pequot land claims litigation, were hostile toward tribal interests. 308 They
argued that allowing the tribe to expand its gaming operations beyond bingo
by opening a casino would negatively impact them, regardless of whether that
casino included slot machines.309
While the Pequots wanted to expand their gaming operations, they also
wanted to ensure that the State of Connecticut respected them as a separate
sovereign.3o Another goal was to prevent the state from taxing their gaming
revenues. While the tribe's sovereignty meant that it could control liquor-
use policies, the degree of state police presence, and any procedures for li-
censing casino employees on the reservation, those interests were subordinate
to the primary objective of running a casino that was as profitable as possible.
B. Opportunities and Barriers of the Initial Negotiations
Similar to the example of peeling the orange,312 Brown saw an oppor-
tunity to create and claim value by focusing on differences. The state's top
priority was to prevent crime from infiltrating the casino and the Ledyard
area, while the Pequots' primary objective was to run a successful casino.
Brown, as lead negotiator for the Pequots, decided he could offer the state the
authority to regulate drug and alcohol use and implement crime-control




307. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 116-17.
308. See id. at 162.
309. See id
310. Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272.
311. Id.
312. See supra Part IV.A.
313. See Edmund Mahony, Who Will Police the Casino? Layoffs Cloud Plans to
Regulate Legal Gambling, State Ponders Policing of Casino, HARTFORD COURANT,
Nov. 10, 1991, at Al; see also Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note
272. Normally a tribe would be quite reluctant to cede such jurisdiction to state law
enforcement. The Pequots, however, had established a good working relationship
with the state's "resident trooper" and felt comfortable allowing the state police to
provide a law enforcement presence at the casino. Telephone Interview with Michael
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quots have control over the casino's business aspects, unrestricted by limits
on the number of gaming tables, square footage of floor space, or operating
hours.314
Brown opened the negotiations by suggesting that, in running the casino
the Pequots would comply voluntarily with all state liquor laws. 315 He made
it clear that the tribe would be willing to make additional concessions if the
state would yield on regulating the casino's business operations.316 State
negotiators agreed to an unlimited number of gaming tables, unconstrained
floor space, and unrestricted operating hours. 3 17 In return, Brown and the
Pequots agreed to allow state police to patrol the casino and to require that all
employees be approved and licensed by the State Department of Special Rev-
enue. 3 1 8 The Pequots, whose income was not subject to taxation, 3 19 would
retain all casino profits after reimbursing the state for money spent on regula-
tion. 32
0
Although a number of issues had been resolved, state negotiators
seemed to be dragging their feet, and the two sides failed to complete an
agreement by Judge Dorsey's August 6 deadline.321 Dorsey brought in a fed-
eral mediator, retired state superior court Judge Henry J. Naruk, to oversee
the negotiations and expedite the process of drafting a compact.322
Throughout the negotiations, the state and the Pequot tribe maintained
separate versions of the compact. As a result of Michael Brown's experience,
the Pequots' version borrowed heavily from New Jersey's casino regulatory
scheme with some concepts taken from Nevada and the Bahamas. 323 Judge
Naruk, the federal mediator, had decided that in October 1990, he would se-
Brown, supra note 272. Additionally, the tribe did not have a system in place to con-
duct criminal background checks, so allowing the state police to conduct such checks
not only allowed the tribe to give a concession to the state but also allowed the tribe to
leverage off the existing capabilities of the state police and avoid having to develop
such capabilities themselves. See id.
314. Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272.
315. Id. See also Proposal of the State of Connecticut for a Tribal-State Compact
Between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the State of Connecticut at 44-45 (Apr.
10, 1991), available at http://www.nigc.gov/Portals/OINIGC Uploads/readingroom/co
mpacts/Mashantucket Pequot Indian Tribe/mashantucketcomp041091.pdf [hereinafter
Tribal-State Compact]. As discussed infra, the tribe ultimately agreed to the state's
version.
316. See Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272.
317. Id.
318. Id. See also Tribal-State Compact, supra note 315, at 14-18.
319. See Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55 (noting that Indian tribes are not taxa-
ble entities).
320. Constance L. Hays, For Fortunate Few, Tribal Casino Promises Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 1991, at Bl.
3 2 1. Id.
322. Id.
323. Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272.
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lect one of the two versions of the compact to be the casino's governing doc-
ument.324
By October, as negotiations neared an end, the two versions were quite
similar, differing on only one major issue. The Pequots wanted to operate
slot machines, which often were a casino's most lucrative revenue source.325
In Atlantic City, for example, slot machines accounted for approximately
32660% of annual gambling proceeds. The state negotiators, on the other
hand, were opposed to slot machines.3 27 The state claimed that the tribe
could not operate slots because state law prohibited slot machines.328 The
tribe countered that the various types of Class III games state laws permitted
were sufficient to give the Pequots the right under IGRA to run slot ma-
329
chines. The state resisted the inclusion of any provisions for slot machines,
even if the provisions would not take effect unless the state deemed slots le-
gal.330
As an interim measure, Brown successfully pressed to negotiate a 100-
page appendix to the compact - approximately one-third of the entire agree-
ment - which addressed future regulation of slot machines. 3 3 The appendix
called for a payout of 91.5% to slot machine bettors, and Foxwoods would
take an "expected win" of 8.5% of the total "slot drop." 332 The appendix,
which even pre-structured settlement of potential lawsuits, would become
operative if the state were ever to permit slot machines. But, for the foresee-
able future, the Pequots and the state agreed to a moratorium on the use of
slot machines at the casino.333 The moratorium could be lifted only if one of
several triggering events occurred, including an agreement between the state
and the tribe that under existing laws, the Pequots did have the right to oper-
ate slots, a court order to the same effect, or a change in state law permitting
the use of video facsimile machines in the state.334
In mid-October, after the state and the Pequots added the slot machine
appendix to their versions of the compact, Michael Brown and Pequot lawyer
Barry Margolin suggested to Judge Naruk that he accept the state's version of
324. Id.
325. That's So Wicked We'll Do It Ourselves, ECONOMIsT, Apr. 11, 1992, at 21;
see also BRETT DUVAL FROMSON, HITTING THE JACKPOT 132 (2003).
326. That's So Wicked We'll Do It Ourselves, supra note 325.
327. EISLER, supra note 9, at 174.




332. Id. By comparison, Nevada and New Jersey slot machines paid out approx-
imately 93%, allowing casinos to retain 7% of the drop. Id
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the compact. 335 The state, meanwhile, had appealed Dorsey's decision to
allow gambling on the reservation to the U.S. Supreme Court. With its
appeal pending, Connecticut refused to sign the compact it had submitted to
Judge Naruk.337 Naruk delivered the unsigned compact to Manuel Lujan, Jr.,
secretary of the Department of the Interior.338
After making several minor changes, 339 Secretary Lujan approved the
agreement that the Pequots and Connecticut had negotiated and that Judge
Naruk had delivered.340 Because Connecticut had refused to sign the docu-
ment, it did not qualify as a tribal-state compact. Instead, Lujan promulgated
it as a federal procedure governing the operation of a casino on the Ledyard
reservation. 34 1 Thus, the state and Pequots had no compact; gambling on the
reservation was governed exclusively by the procedures of the agreement.
342The Supreme Court refused to hear Connecticut's appeal, and Judge
Dorsey's decision stood. The state would have to endorse a compact with the
Pequots or accept gambling regulations for the Pequot reservation that Interi-
or Secretary Lujan created. Connecticut had taken its legal battle as far as it
could and lost. Almost immediately, the tribe broke ground for its 46,000-
343
square-foot casino.
C. Strategic Activities of the Initial Negotiations
In this first round, each side chose its BATNA instead of reaching an
agreement. As a result, the Pequots could initiate gaming operations but
could not install slot machines, which would be the most lucrative component
to a gaming operation. Both sides realized, however, that more rounds were
335. Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272. Technically the
tribe withdrew its version of the compact so that Connecticut could claim that its
version was imposed on the tribe rather than having the tribal version imposed on the
state. See id. While this distinction provided political cover for state officials, the
two versions were so similar as to be substantively identical. See id.
336. See Connecticut v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 498 U.S. 1022 (1991) (deny-
ing certiorari on Apr. 2, 1991).
337. Under the IGRA, the state was given the option of "consenting" to the draft
compact it had submitted to the mediator. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006). Connecticut's
negotiators chose not to do so. See Opportunity to Comment on Mashantucket Pequot
Gaming Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 15,746 (Apr. 17, 1991).
338. See Opportunity to Comment on Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Procedures,
56 Fed. Reg. 15,746.
339. See Notice of Final Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Procedures 56 Fed. Reg.
24,996 (May 31, 1991).
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. Connecticut v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 498 U.S. 1022 (1991).
343. See Wayne King, Atlantic City Shivers at Indians' Casinos to Come, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 1991, § B, at 4.
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to come, and each party took steps away from the table to improve its own
BATNA while attempting to weaken the other side's BATNA.
After Judge Naruk submitted the compact to Secretary Lujan, but before
the casino opened, the general election in Connecticut changed the players at
the table. Now sitting across the table from the Pequots, Governor Weicker
was opposed to gambling in general and slots in particular.3 " Although
Weicker inherited the Pequot situation late in the process, he made it clear
that his top priority, given the sordid history of Connecticut gaming, was to
prevent crime from infiltrating the casino and the surrounding area.3 45 State
Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, also elected in Novermber, 1990, was
also on Weicker's side, as his office was handling the defense of the Pequot
lawsuit.346
Governor Weicker's first effort to thwart the Pequots' casino involved
moving the fight against reservation gambling from the federal court system
to the state legislature. In early 1991, shortly after he took office, he drafted a
bill calling for the repeal of the state law permitting "Las Vegas night" fund-
raising events by charities. 3 47 If passed, the bill would strip the Pequots of the
legal basis for their casino.348 To galvanize opposition to the bill, the Pequots
retained Hartford-based lobbying firm Robinson & Cole. 349 The Hartford
firm's employees worked the corridors of the state Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives to create support for the tribe among lawmakers.350 Also siding
with the Pequots and speaking out against the measure were civic groups,
parochial schools, and charities, which together raised over $80,000 through
"Las Vegas night" events in 1990.351 Additionally, business leaders in south-
ern Connecticut opposed Governor Weicker's proposal, arguing that a Pequot
casino would provide a welcome boost to the regional economy that was reel-
ing from defense-industry cutbacks and a national recession.352 In a Universi-
ty of Connecticut survey of state residents, 68% of those polled supported the
Pequots' right to open a casino on their Ledyard reservation. 35 3
Out-of-state gambling interests that feared that Indian casinos might ex-
pand beyond Connecticut deployed powerful lobbyists of their own to support
Governor Weicker's bill. In May 1991, the state Senate approved the meas-
344. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 130-31, 149.
345. See id. at 131-32.
346. See id. at 131.
347. See John Larrabee, Connecticut Tribe Is on a Roll, USA TODAY, May 9,
1991, at 9A.
348. See id.
349. See Jonathan Rabinovitz, For Pequots' Point Man, No Task Is Too Small,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1995, § B, at 1.
350. See id.
351. Larrabee, supra note 347.
352. Id.
353. Jon Lender, Most Residents Support Pequots on Casino, HARTFORD
COURANT, June 6, 1991, at DI.
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ure in an eighteen to seventeen vote. 354 Soon after the Senate vote, the House
voted eighty-four to sixty-two to reject the governor's proposal.355 Without
the support of a majority in both the Senate and the House, the bill was
dead. 5  The margin of victory was narrow, but the Pequots, once again, had
won.
During all of the legislative maneuvering, the Pequots enhanced their
position by building their casino and hiring and training employees. Fox-
woods opened for business in February 1992 with 2300 employees. 357 The
bingo section, which could seat 2400 players, doubled as a nightclub for en-
tertainers such as Kenny Rogers, who played at Foxwoods' opening celebra-
tion.358 At its grand opening, a medicine man dedicated the casino. 359 The
fifty-one poker tables were kept busy with out-of-town visitors because Fox-
woods was the only casino in the eastern United States that accommodated
360poker players. Conspicuously absent, however, were the seductive flash
and vibrant clamor of slot machines. 36 1
Ten months later, the casino had not yet spent a single hour closed; cus-
362tomers were gambling twenty-four hours a day. Each day, approximately
13,000 people flocked to Foxwoods to play blackjack, craps, roulette, bacca-
363
rat, bingo, poker, and to place off-track bets. Foxwoods was often so
crowded that patrons had to wait hours for a seat at the gaming tables. 3  To
service the crush of eager gamblers, the Pequot tribe had to augment its casi-
no workforce. Within ten months, the casino had ballooned to 3500 employ-
ees, constituting a $60 million payroll.365 In its first year in operation, the
booming casino was on its way to generating significantly more than the $100
366
million in gross revenue that had been projected. Demand was so great
354. Bird, supra note 281.
355. Id.
356. See id.
357. See Lois Weiss, High Rollin' Comes to New England, REAL EST. WEEKLY,
Mar. 25, 1992, at 12A; Careers, FoxWOODs RESORT CASINO, http://www.foxwoods.
com/Careers.aspx (last visited Sept. 18, 2011).
358. Weiss, supra note 357.
359. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 163; FROMSON, supra note 325, at 131.
360. Hilary Waldman, Night Passes Quickly in Casino's Eternal Day, HARTFORD
COURANT, May 26, 1992, at Al.




365. Doug Bailey, States Race to Grab Gaming Dollars, Bos. GLOBE, Jan. 3,
1993, at 1.
366. Id. Gross revenue for a casino is the difference between the total amount
wagered by customers and the amount returned to customers as winnings.
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that in July, only five months after Foxwoods opened, the Pequots embarked
on a $142 million expansion of the complex.367
The expansion included a large hotel, a new casino, a five-story parking
garage, three high-tech theaters, an entertainment and shopping mall, and a
368transportation system featuring trolleys and an outdoor monorail. Work on
the addition, which was more than five times as large as the existing building,
was to be completed by the fall of 1993.6 Casino officials said the new
facilities would double daily attendance at Foxwoods. 3 70
VI. ROUND 2: NEGOTIATING SLOTS AT FOXWOODS
A. Context ofNegotiating Slots at Foxwoods
When Governor Weicker took office in early 1991, the state was in the
throes of a financial crisis. Projections indicated that for the 1990-91 fiscal
year ending June 30 Connecticut would incur a deficit between $800 million
and $1 billion. 371 After the state had enjoyed nearly a decade of operating
surpluses in the 1980s, Connecticut was facing its fourth consecutive year of
deficits. 372 Furthermore, revenue and spending estimates for the 1991-92
fiscal year suggested that unless the state took corrective action, Connecticut
would face a deficit of approximately $2.7 billion in its $7.8 billion budget;
proportionately, this deficit would be the largest shortfall for any state in the
country. 373
In large measure, a deep national recession caused significant fiscal
woes for Connecticut. Historically, the state had derived over half its revenue
from an eight percent sales tax and taxes on corporate income. The slow-
down in economic activity, however, led to a sharp decline in corporate-
generated tax revenue. 374 To make up for this decline in revenue, Governor
Weicker - after one month in office - proposed a personal income tax, which
was enacted into law.375
Although the state expected the personal income tax would eliminate
much of the budget shortfall, it was still an unproven source of revenue, and
estimates of the amount it would generate varied. Most agreed, though, that
367. Bill Keveney, Pequots Plan to Parlay Success into Entertainment Complex,




371. See Joel Lang, Accounting for the Tax, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 8, 1991,
at 12.
372. See Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272.
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the new tax alone would not be enough to close the gap in Connecticut's fi-
nances.376 To balance the budget, the state would have to make deep and
unpopular cuts in government expenditures. 377 Indeed, the governor fought
with the state legislature to trim outlays to the limits of what was politically
feasible. 378
This combination of a new income tax and severe spending cuts enabled
Connecticut to achieve a budget surplus in 1991-92 for the first time in five
years. 379 Feeling optimistic and sensing that the public was weary of sacri-
fice, Governor Weicker promised legislators in the spring of 1992 that he
would not raise taxes for the remainder of his term. 380
Despite the 1992 budget surplus, however, economic conditions in Con-
necticut continued to deteriorate. Rooted in the defense industry, Connecti-
cut's economy suffered severe setbacks as military contracts were canceled in
the post-Cold War environment. 381 In January 1992, Connecticut's unem-
ployment rate reached 7.5%, the highest it had been in a decade.382 In the
spring of 1992, General Dynamics' Electric Boat shipyard in Groton, the
largest private-sector employer in southern Connecticut, announced that it
would lay off half of its 17,000 workers over the next five to six years.3 In
December 1992, Hartford-based Pratt & Whitney, which surpassed Electric
Boat as the state's largest private-sector employer, planned to lay off 5000
members of its Connecticut workforce. 384 This decision would be the third
round of major layoffs at the jet-engine manufacturer in less than twelve
months.385 Furthermore, the layoffs would result in thousands of additional
job losses at the Connecticut companies that supplied materials to Pratt.
Pratt's announcement prompted The Harford Courant to write, "It's fair to
say Connecticut is going through the darkest economic period since the De-
,,386pression.
As layoffs continued unabated around the state, Connecticut budget of-
ficials pared back their tax-revenue forecasts. Estimates of tax collections fell
so sharply that by December 1992, the legislature's Office of Fiscal Analysis




379. See Larry Williams, Budget in Place, but Red Ink Colors Rosy Projections,
HARTFORD COURANT, May 10, 1992, at Al.
380. See id.
381. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 174.
382. W. Joseph Campbell, State Gains Jobs, but Report Lists Region's Woes,
HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 2, 1992, at D7.
383. Lyn Bixby & Brant Houston, Defense Firms Try to Regroup, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 3, 1991, at Al.
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budget of approximately $8 billion, assuming existing programs were main-
tained and expenditures were adjusted only for inflation. 38 7 Having promised
not to raise taxes and aware that lawmakers had little appetite for further
spending cuts, Governor Weicker found himself in a predicament that afford-
ed little maneuvering room. Yet, if Governor Weicker and the General
Assembly did not act soon to prevent the budget shortfall, a financial crisis
would engulf the state. There seemed to be no give: the governor and legisla-
ture had to produce a balanced budget for the 1993-94 fiscal year.
In the southeast corner of the state, meanwhile, the Pequots were build-
ing a casino that looked as if it would become a gold mine. Unfortunately for
Governor Weicker and Connecticut legislators, the state could not tax profits
the casino earned. For all the excitement the Pequots' casino generated, the
state would not share in the spoils, but the Pequots' success quickly attracted
other gambling interests to the state.
By the fall of 1992, Governor Weicker, who remained opposed to legal-
ized gambling, faced mounting political pressure kindled by commercial
gambling heavyweights. Trump, Bally, Harrah's, and Mirage lobbied state
legislators to secure licenses for non-Indian casinos.389 Mirage owner Ste-
phen Wynn made particularly aggressive overtures to the state, promising to
create jobs and provide attractive tax benefits. 390 Wynn and his big-league
gambling compatriots pointed out that the state treasury was missing out on
the gambling boom at Foxwoods because the Pequots were not required to
pay taxes on their casino's profits or their personal earnings.391 At best, in the
case of Foxwoods, the state was receiving an incidental benefit of state in-
392come tax paid by non-Indian employees. Why, asked Wynn, if casino-
style gambling was introduced within state boundaries, should the state's
taxpayers be denied the chance to share in casino earnings? 393 He spent sev-
eral million dollars lobbying state legislators and sponsoring other pro-
gambling activities such as casino job fairs.394
387. Kirk Johnson, Taxes and Gambling Top Lawmakers' List, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
3, 1993, § 13CN, at 1.
388. See Williams, supra note 379.
389. See Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272.
390. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 173-74.
391. See id. By contrast, Nevada and New Jersey casinos were paying state taxes
of between 6 and 8% of gross revenue. Telephone Interview with Michael Brown,
supra note 272.
392. The state also benefited from a sales tax on meals and an excise tax on liq-
uor, but these payments amounted to less than income taxes paid by non-Indian em-
ployees.
393. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 173-74.
394. See Hilary Waldman, Mirage Stages Media Blitz, HARTFORD COURANT, Apr.
25, 1993, at Bi; see also For the Record, HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 22, 1995, at A3
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In March 1992, Wynn treated four Connecticut lawmakers to an all-
expenses-paid weekend at his opulent Mirage resort and casino in Las Vegas,
flying them out on his private jet.395 There he unveiled an architectural blue-
print for the $350 million casino he hoped to open in Hartford, and he dis-
cussed the possibility of opening a second casino in Bridgeport.396 Harrah's
and other gambling concerns followed suit, revealing their own plans for
-397Connecticut casinos.
The movement to legalize casino gambling in Connecticut was gather-
ing steam. In the spring of 1992, the state legislature commissioned an eight-
een-member task force to study the gambling issue and to make a recommen-
dation to the General Assembly by January 1993 about whether Connecticut
should permit non-Indian casinos.398 A poll conducted in September 1992
showed that 56% of respondents approved of the state's raising revenue
through legalized gambling while only 37% disapproved.399 In November
1992, the Connecticut state Senate elected William A. DiBella, a Hartford
Democrat and friend of Stephen Wynn, to become the body's majority leader
when its next legislative session began in January 1993.400 DiBella was the
Senate's most outspoken advocate for casinos in Hartford and Bridgeport and
of video slot machines at existing pari-mutuel facilities. With many Connect-
icut residents supportive of casinos and with DiBella leading the Senate, in-
troduction of a bill during the upcoming legislative session that would permit
401
expanded gambling in the state seemed almost certain. To Governor
Weicker, gambling on the Pequot reservation no longer posed the greatest
threat to a healthy social environment in Connecticut.402 Foxwoods, after all,
had not given rise to drugs, prostitution, or other crime problems in Le-
395. Hilary Waldman, Lawmakers See Life in the Glitter Lane, HARTFORD
COURANT, Mar. 22, 1992, at Al.
396. See id.; Elizabeth Ross, Connecticut Links Casino Proposal to State Reve-
nues, Job Creation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 26, 1993, at 9.
397. Hilary Waldman, Harrah's Unveils Plan for Bridgeport Casino, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 19, 1992, at Bl.
398. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 178; Hilary Waldman, The Unraveling of Casino
Proposal, HARTFORD COURANT, May 23, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Waldman, Unrav-
eling].
399. Don Noel, Will DiBella Goad Weicker to Run in 1994?, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 20, 1992, at Cl5. The poll was conducted by the Institute for Social
Inquiry at the University of Connecticut. Id.
400. See EISLER, supra note 9, at 175; Hilary Waldman, Anita M. Seline & Mike
Swift, In Casino War, You Can't Tell the Players Without a Scorecard, HARTFORD
COURANT, Dec. 21, 1992, at Al.
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403dyard. The real threat, in the governor's view, was the corporate-
sponsored movement to legalize casinos throughout the state.40
But circumstances were combining to make life even harder for Con-
necticut's governor. By January 1993, Governor Weicker, who had risked
political suicide by spearheading the income tax and making unprecedented
cuts in expenditures, again faced a looming deficit, projected to be at least
$424 million.4 05 He also faced broad legislative support for statewide legali-
zation of gambling.406
Meanwhile, casino operators from Las Vegas and Atlantic City contin-
ued to woo state and local officials, hoping to win the right to build gambling
407and entertainment complexes in Hartford and Bridgeport. They promised
408jobs and revenue for Connecticut and its two largest cities. The state's
legal jai alai frontons and dog track, which were struggling financially, also
lobbied for slot machines.409 A specially assembled State Casino Gambling
Task Force scheduled a vote in early January 1993 on whether to recommend
410that the legislature legalize casino gambling.
During that same time, Brown had gotten to know Robert Werner, a key
aide to Governor Weicker, who in the fall of 1992 had been appointed direc-
tor of the State Division of Special Revenue. 411 The division oversaw legal-
ized gambling in the state and was responsible for regulating the Foxwoods
412
casino. In the months since Werner had been named director, Brown and
Werner had met a number of times to discuss road improvements and other
issues at Foxwoods.413 Now, Brown reasoned that he might be able to get
slot machines on the governor's agenda by working through Werner. By
going first to Werner, Brown hoped to win the support of a key member of
the governor's inner circle.414 If Werner was enthusiastic, Governor Weicker




405. See Mark Pazniokas & Larry Williams, Weicker May Propose Sales Tax
Expansion, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 8, 1993, at Al.
406. See supra notes 354-56 and accompanying text.
407. Peggy McCarthy, Boom or Bust: State Weighs Legalizing Casinos, N.Y.




411. See Mark Pazniokas, Weicker Reassigns Gaming Official, HARTFORD
COURANT, Sept. 2, 1992, at B1 [hereinafter Pazniokas, Weicker Reassigns Gaming
Official]; Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272.
412. See Pazniokas, Weicker Reassigns Gaming Official, supra note 411.
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B. Opportunities and Barriers ofNegotiating
Slots at Foxwoods415
In late 1992, Brown learned from Werner that Connecticut was facing a
416$424 million budget shortfall for the 1993-94 fiscal year. The governor
and the legislature were required to agree on a balanced budget by July 1,
1993. In response, Brown and Werner discussed the possibility of having the
Pequots help the state make up the budgetary shortfall in exchange for the
right to operate slot machines at Foxwoods. Encouraged by his conversations
with Werner, Brown met with the Pequots' seven-member tribal council and
proposed that the tribe offer to make voluntary payments to Connecticut.
Brown, however, suggested an intriguing twist on this basic idea: the Pequot
payments would be conditional on tribal exclusivity for the operation of slot
machines in the state. He estimated that the tribe could earn $400-$500 mil-
lion in annual slot machine revenue. The tribal council supported Brown's
proposal.
On a Friday evening in December, Brown and Werner met at a coffee
shop where Brown made a case for slot machines at Foxwoods. He pointed
out that the casino had flourished, providing thousands of jobs without at-
tracting the drugs, prostitution, and organized crime that its detractors feared.
To build on Foxwoods' success, he added, the Pequots would like to operate
slot machines. Brown emphasized two looming threats facing the Weicker
administration. First, Mirage Resorts and Harrah's Entertainment had
stepped up their efforts to build casinos in Connecticut, and their supporters
had introduced a proposal for non-Indian gambling in the legislature. Gover-
nor Weicker was opposed to new casinos, and the legislative proposal could
undermine his anti-gambling stance. Second, the state faced a $424 million
budget shortfall for the 1993-94 fiscal year. By granting the Pequots exclu-
sive slot machine operation in Connecticut in exchange for voluntary pay-
ments from the tribe to the state, noted Brown, the governor would be able to
contain the spread of gambling and, at the same time, sharply and relatively
painlessly reduce the budget gap. After hearing Brown out, Werner left the
table and made a phone call to the governor's mansion. When he returned, he
told Brown that the governor would meet him the following morning.
At that meeting, Michael Brown and Pequot legal advisors Barry Mar-
golin and Robert Gips met Governor Weicker at his home. Brown outlined
the slot machine proposal he had described to Werner. The governor was
intrigued. He was unwilling, however, to sign a state budget partially funded
by a percentage of the projected and "therefore uncertain" revenues of a casi-
no; he insisted that the Pequots guarantee a minimum annual payment.
415. The following paragraphs detailing the interactions between Brown, Werner,
Weicker, and the tribe are all based on the Telephone Interview with Michael Brown,
supra note 272.
416. See Johnson, supra note 387.
2011] 1099
55
Clarkson and Sebenius: Clarkson: Leveraging Tribal Sovereignty
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Brown proposed that, each year, the Pequots pay the state twenty-five percent
of annual slot machine revenues or $100 million, whichever was greater.
Brown stipulated, however, that the Pequots must be permitted to terminate
voluntary payments "while retaining the right to operate slot machines" if slot
machines were ever legalized anywhere in Connecticut other than Foxwoods.
While Governor Weicker liked the $100 million guarantee, he had two
concerns. First, he feared slot machines might not be legal in Connecticut,
and second, he was not convinced that he had the authority to commit the
state to a slot machine deal with the Pequots without legislative approval.
Hesitant to endorse such an arrangement behind closed doors without the
consent of Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, he suggested bringing
Blumenthal into the negotiations.
Immediately, the Pequots' representatives made it clear that they would
withdraw their offer if Blumenthal became involved. Brown and his associ-
ates pointed out that in court cases in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Arizona,judges had ruled that vendors could legally operate arcade games such as
"Space Invaders" that reward high-scoring players with free games.4 7 They
argued that these rulings provided sufficient precedent to justify the operation
of video slot machines at Foxwoods. The legality of slot machines, they
claimed, was not an issue.
More subtle, said Brown, was the legal reasoning which assured that the
governor had the authority to enter a binding slot machine agreement with the
Pequots without the involvement of the legislature. Brown pointed out that
the state's compact with the Pequots listed video slot machines among the
games permitted on the reservation. The compact also placed a moratorium
on the operation of slot machines at Foxwoods, however, until a dispute be-
418tween the Pequots and the state was resolved. The dispute arose when the
parties formulated the compact. Negotiators for the Pequots claimed slot
machines were legal under state law; negotiators for the state claimed they
were not. As a compromise, the two sides made provisions for the operation
of slot machines on the Pequot reservation with the understanding that the
provisions were inoperable until the legal dispute was settled. At the gover-
nor's mansion, Brown argued that Governor Weicker could end the dispute
by contending that, based on the precedent established in the Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and Arizona cases, the operation of slot machines was in fact
permissible under Connecticut law. Brown argued that Governor Weicker
had the authority to do so because he would not be creating new law but in-
terpreting and adhering to existing law; while the former would require legis-
lative approval, the latter did not. Under the circumstances, said Brown, the
governor had absolute authority to enter into a slot machine agreement with
the Pequots on behalf of the state.
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Brown, Margolin, and Gips managed to placate Governor Weicker's
concerns, and the governor agreed to the Pequots' proposal. Over the next
few weeks, the Pequots' legal counsel and the governor's office drew up a
seven-page memorandum of understanding which would permit the Pequots
to operate slot machines exclusively in exchange for guaranteed payments to
the state. Later, Brown would acknowledge that secret, independent action
on the part of Governor Weicker was critical to consummating the deal. Ac-
cording to Brown, if knowledge of the pending arrangement had become
public before the parties finalized the deal, Stephen Wynn and other gambling
interests would have launched powerful lobbying efforts to turn public senti-
ment against the Pequots' bid to secure the exclusive right to operate slot
machines in the state. "Furthermore," Brown would point out, "if Weicker
had sought an opinion [from the attorney general], the agreement would have
fallen apart. The legislature would have gotten wind of the deal and would
have prevented it."
On January 5th, the eighteen-member State Casino Gambling Task
Force voted twelve to six in favor of recommending that the state legislature
419
approve casinos in Hartford and Bridgeport4. The task force also recom-
mended that the state legalize video slot machines at casinos, jai alai frontons,
420dog tracks, and off-track betting parlors.
On January 13th, Governor Weicker invited the media to a press confer-
ence to witness the signing of the memorandum of understanding he had ne-
gotiated with the Pequots.42 1 The agreement was a surprise to the public.4 22
Many legislators were stunned by the governor's unilateral action that pre-
empted pro-corporate gambling measures they were about to undertake. 423
The agreement permitted the Pequot tribe to install an unlimited number
of video slot machines at the Foxwoods casino.424 In return, the Pequots
would pay the state $30 million by the end of Connecticut's fiscal year on
425June 30, 1993. In the following fiscal year, the Pequots would contribute
$100 million to the state.426 In subsequent years, the tribe would pay the state
$100 million or twenty-five percent of slot machine revenues, whichever was
greater.427 If the state ever permitted any other organization to operate slot
419. See Two More Casinos?, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 7, 1993, at C2; Wald-
man, Unraveling, supra note 398.
420. See Two More Casinos?, supra note 419.
421. FROMSON, supra note 325, at 140.
422. See Mark Pazniokas, Governor Playing Good Odds, HARTFORD COURANT,
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machines in Connecticut, however, the Pequots would no longer be required
to make payments to the state.428
Governor Weicker announced that his office had drawn up a plan, sub-
ject to legislative approval, under which the state would distribute the Pe-
quots' payments to Connecticut's 169 cities and towns.429 Sixty percent of
the money ($60 million in 1993-94) would go to the state's poorest communi-
430
ties, including Hartford and Bridgeport. Municipalities that housed large
tracts of tax-exempt property, such as colleges, hospitals, and state prisons
would share the rest. 431 "No town in the state would [receive] less than
$5000."432 Most city leaders, including Hartford Mayor Carrie Saxon Perry,
were enthusiastic about Governor Weicker's disbursement plan, called
PILOT for "payments in lieu of taxes."433
With the agreement in place, legalization of slot machines anywhere in
Connecticut other than Foxwoods would cause the state to lose at least $100
million in guaranteed annual revenue, and even more if Foxwoods' slot ma-
chine revenue projections proved accurate.434 As Carl J. Schiessl, a Demo-
cratic state representative from Windsor, pointed out, "The governor has
proven once again that he is an exquisite strategist . . . . He has added $100
million to the anti-casino arsenal. Casino proponents will have to overcome
that.,435 Any non-Indian casino facility would not only have to pay tax on its
own operations (likely 6-8% based on Nevada and New Jersey rates at that
time),436 but also likely would have to compensate Connecticut for the loss of
the Pequot's voluntary payments. This added requirement would be a painful
hurdle for a non-Indian casino to surmount.
On January 16th, the Pequots installed the first 100 video slot machines
at Foxwoods.437 Michael Brown reported that the casino hoped to have 1260
slot machines in operation by March 1st.438 The new slot machines would
428. See Kirk Johnson, Slot Machines Are Delayed; Weicker's Deal Is Hailed,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1993, at 27.
429. See Hilary Waldman, Slot Money Would Boost Poor Cities, HARTFORD
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offer a variety of games, including video poker, draw poker, and video black-
jack.439 Over half, however, would "resemble the traditional one-armed ban-
dits on which players [win by matching] fruits or other symbols.'A 0 Brown
believed that the casino eventually could operate as many as 3000 slot ma-
chines." 1 In the first week that slot machines were operational at Foxwoods,
casino attendance increased by 60%.4 2
C. Strategic Activities ofNegotiating Slots at Foxwoods
Having built Governor Weicker a "golden bridge," the Pequots enticed
the governor to join their side of the table. Implementation of the agreement
was far from certain, and the newly realigned sides continued efforts to im-
prove their respective BATNAs while weakening those of their opponents.
Advocates of non-Indian gambling, rallying behind Senate Majority
leader DiBella, questioned Governor Weicker's authority to negotiate a slot
machine deal with the Pequots without involving the state legislature." 3 Sen-
ate Pro Tem John B. Larson, also a Hartford Democrat, wrote Governor
Weicker a letter charging the governor with overstepping his constitutional
bounds in signing the slot machine agreement.4" Larson demanded that the
governor submit the memorandum of understanding to the General Assembly
for approval.445 In a three-page reply to Larson, Governor Weicker main-
tained that he lawfully discharged his duties as governor and asserted that he
had no intention of submitting the agreement to the legislature for approv-
446
al.
Governor Weicker's adversaries arranged a meeting on January 14th
with State Attorney General Richard Blumenthal to demand a ruling on the
matter. 447 At the meeting, Blumenthal acknowledged that his office had not
been involved in the negotiations between the governor and the Pequots and
that he knew nothing of the impending slot machine agreement until the day
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448. Hilary Waldman & Christopher Keating, Casino Backers Seek to Counter
Weicker's Slot Ploy, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 15, 1993, at Al.
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er an official opinion on the legality of the agreement.449 Governor Weicker
and his opponents agreed to accept Blumenthal's legal opinion as binding.450
Stephen Wynn, aware that Governor Weicker's deal with the Pequots
had jeopardized his plans to build casinos in Connecticut, intensified his lob-
bying and publicity efforts. He touted the $350 million "urban entertainment
center" that Mirage Resorts, Inc., had proposed for downtown Hartford.451
The complex was designed to include a casino, "hotel, convention center, six-
screen movie theater, ice-skating rink, a 1500-seat performing arts center,
retail shops, and restaurants."452 The company had proposed a similar $300
million facility for Bridgeport.4 53 The situation had escalated into a bidding
war with the Pequots. Wynn announced that he would guarantee state and
local tax payments of $140 million per year if the state permitted Mirage Re-
sorts to build casinos in Hartford and Bridgeport.454 "'The governor made a
bad deal with the Indians and we make a better one,' Wynn said. 'I'll guaran-
tee $140 million. Period."'415
Despite Wynn's pronouncements, Representative William Dyson, a
New Haven Democrat, pointed out that legislators who liked the idea of ex-
panded gambling in the state would be reluctant to sanction new casinos, for
456 ,doing so would put an end to payments from the Pequots. Do you take
the [sure] money, or do you take a risk?' Dyson asked. 'It's the old adage of
[a] bird in hand [versus] bird in bush. I'm for bird in hand."-457
On February 11th, Attorney General Blumenthal delivered an opinion to
the speaker of Connecticut's House of Representatives on the legality of the
memorandum of understanding.458 Blumenthal concluded that the agreement
459did not establish new laws or amend existing ones. Instead, it clarified a
matter of dispute that arose in the original tribal state compact, namely,
"whether based on existing state law" video slot machine gambling was per-
mitted under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.460 Blumenthal wrote:
It is the Attorney General's opinion that execution of this agree-
ment is fundamentally executive in nature, rather than legislative.
449. See Waldman, Weicker Rejects Request on Slots, supra note 442.
450. Id.
451. Ross, supra note 396.
452. Id.
453. Id.
454. Hilary Waldman & Michele Jacklin, Attorney General Rules Slot Machine
Pact Is Legal, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 12, 1993, at DI.
455. Id.
456. Waldman, Slot Money Would Boost Poor Cities, supra note 429.
457. Id.
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In executing the Memorandum, the Governor acted as the chief ex-
ecutive as he was interpreting, implementing and executing the law
.... While there is no specific statute specifically authorizing the
Governor to sign this agreement, his power to do so clearly ema-
nates from his Constitutional power to see that the laws be faithful-
ly executed. Section 12 of Article IV of the Connecticut Constitu-
tion.... In conclusion, there is no legal requirement in support of
the contention that the Memorandum should have been submitted
to the legislature for approval.461
Over the next two months, the Pequots installed more than 1000 slot ma-
chines at Foxwoods.462
On June 30, 1993, the Pequots delivered $30 million to Connecticut's
Department of Special Revenue, pursuant to the agreement. 463 The tribe's
slot machines had been in operation since February and were one of the pri-
mary reasons that revenue at Foxwoods grew from $120 million in the casi-
no's first year to nearly $1 billion in its second year.
Meanwhile, the state legislature still was haggling over a budget for the
1993-1994 fiscal year. The state constitution required that the legislature
submit a balanced budget for the approaching fiscal year by midnight on July
1st. On the morning of July 1st, however, the budget reflected a shortfall of
$13 million, and legislators were no longer willing to compromise on spend-
ing. Desperate, the speakers of the House and Senate called Michael Brown,
pleading with him to persuade the Pequot tribe to increase its minimum guar-
anteed payment to the state from $100 million to $113 million for the next
fiscal year only. In the afternoon, Brown met tribal leaders and convinced
them that by voluntarily increasing their guaranteed payment by $13 million
in a time of fiscal crisis, the Pequots could "lock up the support of the legisla-
tive branch." In a discussion that lasted "less than five minutes," the tribal
council agreed to pledge an additional $13 million to the state. The legisla-
ture prepared a bill documenting this special, one-time arrangement and
passed a balanced budget before the midnight deadline. The Pequots de-
manded nothing in return for the increased payment guarantee.
461. Id.
462. See Hilary Waldman, Jersey May Feel Pequot Slot Take, HARTFORD
COURANT, Mar. 6, 1993
463. Telephone Interview with Michael Brown, supra note 272. This paragraph
and the following paragraph are based on that interview.
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D. Prologue
Over the course of the year, the Pequots undertook massive expansion
projects at the newly renamed Foxwoods Resort Casino.4 6 In the fall, the
tribe completed construction of the Two Trees Inn, a 280-room hotel next to
465the reservation. On the reservation itself, the Pequots completed a 1.3 mil-
lion square-foot, eight-story tower that housed a new casino and 312 room
luxury hotel called Great Cedar Hotel, complete with a health spa, a fine din-
466ing restaurant, and meeting and conference rooms. The casino expansion
involved five large gaming areas, including sixty-four additional gaming ta-
467bles and 1,150 additional slot machines. At the entrance to the concourse
was a man-made waterfall with a twelve-foot statue of an Indian on top.468
The Indian held a bow and arrow in the air and every hour "shot" a teal laser
beam towards the sky, setting off a simulated rainstorm.469 Additional man-
made waterfalls and sculptures of Indian warriors were spread throughout the
complex. As part of the grand opening celebration for the new tower, the
Pequots booked Frank Sinatra as the inaugural performer at the Fox Thea-
ter.470
The construction bill for the new tower and concourse was $240 million,
which the Pequots paid out of casino profits.471 The tribe changed the official
name of the gambling and entertainment complex from Foxwoods High
Stakes Bingo & Casino to Foxwoods Resort & Casino.472
By the end of 1993, Foxwoods had 234 table games, 3108 slot ma-
chines, and 139,000 square feet of gaming space.473 By 1995, more than
464. See Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise Inc., FUNDINGUNIVERSE.COM,
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Mashantucket-Pequot-Gaming-




468. Hilary Waldman, Expansion Would Make Casino Biggest in Hemisphere,
HARTFORD COURANT, July 5, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Waldman, Expansion].
469. Id.
470. Kirk Johnson, A Casino and a Crooner: They Did It Their Way, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1993, § 1, at 23. Sinatra cost the Pequots $750,000, but he attracted a full
house on each of the five nights he performed. See id.
471. See Waldman, Expansion, supra note 468; Mashantucket Pequot Gaming
Enterprise Inc., supra note 464.
472. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise Inc., supra note 464.
473. Mark Chapman, Out of the Woods; Foxwoods Becomes a Full-Service Gam-
ing Resort - and There's More on the Way, Bos. HERALD, Dec. 5, 1993, at 55.
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30,000 people had visited the casino.474 It was reported to be the largest and
most profitable casino in the world.475
VII. MAJOR SHIFTS IN THE NEGOTIATION LANDSCAPE
Given the enormous success of Foxwoods, tribes from all over the Unit-
ed States began to push for gaming compacts. Sometimes those compacts
came easily, and other times the states were obstructionist. Each side also
made moves "away from the table" either to improve their position or to
worsen the other sides' BATNA. One portion of IGRA that gained scrutiny
and created immediate conflict between states and tribes was the "good faith
bargaining" provision. Since that section of IGRA forced states to the nego-
tiating table, altering that requirement was a logical area for a state to focus
its strategic efforts.
A. Seminole Tribe v. Florida:4 76 The States Adjust Their BATNAs
In September 1991, the Seminole Tribe of Florida sued the State of Flor-
ida, alleging "that respondents had 'refused to enter into any negotiation for
inclusion of [certain gaming activities] in a tribal-state compact,' thereby
violating [IGRA's] 'requirement of good faith negotiation' . . . ."7 Florida
responded by arguing that the suit violated the state's sovereign immunity
from suit in federal court.478 After procedural battles in the lower courts, the
parties appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.479
After finding that Congress had abrogated the states' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity from suit, the Court held in a five-four decision that Congress
acted beyond its Constitutional power when it made states subject to suit for
bargaining in bad faith with tribes over gaming compacts. 480 At issue was the
interplay in the language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A), which requires states
to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe regarding the formation of a
gaming compact, and 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7), which authorizes a tribe to
bring suit in federal court against a state to enforce that duty.481 The Court
also held that the doctrine set forth in Ex parte Young did not allow tribes to
474. See Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise Inc., supra note 464.
475. Hilary Waldman, Pequot Tribe to Aid Special Olympics, HARTFORD
COURANT, Nov. 30, 1993, at Cl.
476. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
477. Id. at 51-52.
478. Id. at 52.
479. Id. at 52-53.
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sue state officials in their official capacities as a way around the Eleventh
Amendment's grant of state immunity from suit.482
Commentators have criticized Seminole Tribe on a number of theoretical
483grounds, but from a practical standpoint, the decision disrupted IGRA's
compromise, as states were now immune from suit even if they were lacking
good faith in the negotiation of gaming compacts. This shift in the negotia-
tion landscape allowed states to demand a large share of tribal gaming pro-
ceeds, which was not IGRA's intent. As former NIGC general counsel Kevin
Washburn noted,
From a purely legal standpoint, it is difficult to reconcile revenue
sharing arrangements with Congress's intentions in IGRA.. .. The
compacting process was not intended to give states a veto over
such gaming, but rather to give states an opportunity to address le-
gitimate public policy concerns related to the tribes' exercise of the
right. In other words, the compacting process was intended to give
482. Id. at 45.
483. See, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing
in Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REV. 407, 482 (1999) (The Court essentially "pre-
serve[ed] the power to grant itself jurisdiction where Congress is constitutionally
barred," by claiming "the institutional right, where private lawsuits challenge state
interests, to have not just the last word but the only word on the scope of its own
constitutional authority."); David S. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist
Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86
MINN. L. REV. 267, 284-85 (2001) (arguing that Seminole Tribe was yet another ex-
ample of the current Court's efforts to find ways to limit the scope of Indian tribal
power). One could also argue that the Court inconsistently read Article 1, Section 8,
cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution, which reads "Congress shall have ... to regulate Com-
merce . .. among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONsT. art. I, §
8, cl. 1, 3. The Court noted that the: "Interstate Commerce Clause granted Congress
the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, [since] the power to regulate inter-
state commerce would be incomplete without the authority to render States liable in
damages." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Arguably, the instrumentality required to enforce the Indian Com-
merce Power, itself predicated on the need of the central government to control com-
merce "with the Indian tribes," U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, very closely resembles
that required to control commerce "between the several states." Id. The Court ap-
pears to believe that five additional words in the Constitution transform the phrase.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 45, 47. In some circumstances, it is an indispensable
power to "render states liable in damages," id at 59, in order to accomplish important
federal goals. In others, where Indians are involved, the same phrase, albeit with five
additional words, when used in much the same way, enables an unconstitutional abro-
gation of state sovereignty. Id. at 44.
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states a voice in Indian gaming to address legitimate concerns, not
to give states an opportunity to demand a cut of the profits. 484
Additionally, Seminole Tribe defanged the IGRA by removing the only tool
tribes possessed to ensure the exercise of their right to conduct gaming on
their lands, the ability to force the states to sit at the negotiating table. The
economic consequences were obvious.
From a Coasian perspective, the significance of Seminole is that it
licenses states to act as holdouts over Class III compacts - as play-
ers who rationally defect from a process akin to a complex prison-
er's dilemma game. . . . There has been a marked reduction in
compacts negotiated since Seminole, and states like California,
New Mexico, and Wisconsin are taking a much tougher line with
'their' tribes. 485
How the Department of the Interior will handle the actions of these
holdout states remains to be seen, but by removing the ability of the tribes to
force the states to the negotiating table, the states worsened the tribal
BATNA.
B. Adjustments to Tribal BATNAs
Subsequent attempts have tried to rebalance the situation. In response to
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Secretary of the Interior promulgated regula-
tions permitting tribal gaming in the absence of state agreement.486 Addition-
ally, the Department of Interior implemented a policy of refusing to approve
compacts that incorporate revenue sharing if the state does not provide a sub-
487
stantial level of exclusivity to the tribe. This policy gives the tribes an
additional bargaining angle if the state gets too greedy in asking for a per-
centage of Indian gaming revenues.
Perhaps more influential on the tribal BATNA is the technological pro-
gression of gaming machines. Although Class 11 gaming originally was con-
ceived of as bingo, enterprising tribes and gaming equipment developers
worked to simulate the "Class Ill experience," but used technology that fell
484. Kevin K. Washburn, Indian Gaming: A Primer on the Development ofIndian
Gaming, the NIGC, and Several Important Unresolved Issues, A.B.A. Center for
Continuing Legal Education National Institute, Criminal Justice Section, Gaming
Enforcement, Feb. 7-8, 2002.
485. Paul H. Brietzke & Teresa L. Kline, The Law and Economics of Native
American Casinos, 78 NEB. L. REV. 263, 313 (1999).
486. Class Ill Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,535 (proposed Apr. 12, 1999)
(to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 291).
487. See Kevin Gover, Revenue Sharing 367-70 (Apr. 14, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
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488
within the scope of Class II gaming. The inner workings of such equip-
ment were based on a bingo-style simulation, but the user interface attempted
to approximate a slot machine or other video gaming device that ordinarily
would fall under Class II.489 This development was possible because the
definition of Class 11 allowed such games to be played using a computer, an
electronic device, or other technological aid.4 90 As Class II gaming technolo-
gy becomes more sophisticated, the distinction between these machines and
true Class III machines diminishes. Such machines can be considered "Class
11.9" machines, and their profitability approaches that of true Class III ma-
491
chines.
Since Class II gaming does not require a tribal-state compact, a tribe
could open a casino with exclusively Class 11.9 machines and cut the state out
of any revenue share whatsoever if a state refused to negotiate in good faith
on Class III machines. Thus, while the relative bargaining strength may have
shifted toward the state after Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Code of Federal
Regulations and the technological advancement of gaming equipment have
caused the pendulum to swing back towards the tribes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Although Seminole eviscerated IGRA's mechanism for balancing tribal
and state interests, tribes are still able to negotiate gaming compacts that ad-
vance tribal interests. The agreement concluded between the Seneca Nation
of Indians and the State of New York is an example of a post-Seminole
agreement where the tribe applied the lessons from Foxwoods.492 Although a
successful outcome may have required a heightened level of strategic negotia-
tion acumen on the part of the tribe, the Senecas were able to negotiate a deal
that allowed them to open a casino on the shores of Niagara Falls and were
able to convince the state essentially to give them the land upon which to
build the casino.
Although much of this Article has focused on the negotiation dynamics
surrounding gaming compacts, the strategic lessons from these negotiations
are nonetheless applicable beyond the gaming context. For example, the
most recent bargaining challenge for the Pequots is not with the State of Con-
488. See Frank Legato, Class II: Is It Fair?, CASINOCENTER.COM, http://www.
casinocenter.com/?p=265 (last visited Mar. 12, 2012) (describing development of
Class II machines that approach the functionality of their Class III "slot cousins").
489. See id.
490. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(7)(i) (2006).
491. See Legato, supra note 488 (describing how Class II programmers "figured
out the odds of hitting certain patterns on the bingo card [and then taking] those bingo
patterns and plug[ging] them right into the payout scheme to replicate any Class III
game" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
492. See NYS Gaming Compact, SENECA NATION INDIANs, http://www.sni.org/
Government/GamingCompact.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2012).
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necticut but instead with the bondholders that have lent money to the tribe's
gaming operations. 493 While Foxwoods remains the largest casino in the
United States, it was nonetheless hit by the economic downturn in 2008 just
like the rest of the gaming industry. 494 As a result, the tribe sought to restruc-
ture nearly $2 billion in debt. 49
Unlike traditional corporate gaming companies, however, Foxwoods
and its bondholders do not have the complete set of restructuring tools at their
disposal. Because of their sovereign status of the tribe and the prohibition of
non-tribal ownership of tribal casinos, Foxwoods could not do a debt-for-
equity swap or raise additional capital by selling off assets on tribal trust
land.496 While corporate gaming creditors may have the option of operating a
gaming facility after the gaming operator seeks protection in bankruptcy,
tribes are not eligible for relief under the bankruptcy code.497 Since tribes do
not fit into any of the categories of debtor under Section 109 of the bankrupt-
cy code,498 reorganization under bankruptcy is not an option. Thus the only
option is a negotiated restructuring with the various classes of bondholders.
The Peqots and their creditors are not the first to face this challenge; at
least three other tribes have defaulted on their obligations as a result of the
economic downturn.499 While the Poaque Pueblosoo and Little Traverse Bay
Band of Odawa Indians50 have successfully concluded their restructuring
negotiations, the Pequot negotiation is still ongoing as this Article goes to
press. Although a detailed analysis of the respective BATNAs of the various
parties in these restructuring negotiations is beyond the scope of this Article,
the underlying negotiation principles remain the same.
493. See Mike Spector, Foxwoods Debt Talks Test Tribal Bets, WALL ST. J., July




496. See Beth Jinks & Jonathan Keehner, Foxwoods Casino Owner Said to Seek
Debt Restructuring, BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aFW61pAhuSqU.
497. IGRA also mandates that the tribe has the "sole proprietary interest and re-
sponsibility for the conduct of any gaming activity," thus preventing bondholders
from assuming control of an Indian gaming facility. 25 U.S.C. §2710(b)(2)(A)
(2006).
498. Section 109 of the code has two categories for debtors, persons and munici-
palities. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
499. See Jinks & Keehner, supra note 496.
500. See Jessica Dyer, Buffalo Thunder Debt Will Be Restructured,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Nov 13, 2010, at 1.
501. See Press Release, Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, Little Tray-
erse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians Completes Financial Restructuring (Nov. 30,
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In fact, in a post-Seminole world where tribes cannot force states to the
bargaining table, gaming compact negotiations arguably have become more
like non-gaming negotiations, where advancing the full set of one's interests
requires jointly decided action. The story of Foxwoods provides excellent
examples of both types of negotiations.
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